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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to determine how post-Cold War NATO allies 
have contributed to transatlantic relations, both in times of crisis and in times of 
harmony. Their contribution, although less significant when compared to long-
time members’ military capabilities, takes various forms. Their support in times of 
disagreement among allies over the Iraq 2002–2003 issue proved to be more 
valuable than was anticipated. 
Therefore, my research is an introspective look at the events that marked 
NATO’s evolution during the last fifteen years and their implications for NATO 
members as units and for traditional transatlantic relations as a whole. 
Successive NATO enlargements proved that each decision to add new 
members reflected NATO’s priorities at that particular moment. Whether it was a 
pre-Cold War enlargement or a post-Cold War enlargement, the decision 
reflected NATO’s interests. Some of the decisions were predominantly military; 
some were in accordance with the international order established after World 
War II. The post-Cold War enhancements had two major characteristics: the first 
enlargement was more symbolic than the second because it erased the artificial 
lines set by Yalta, whereas the second one was much more practical. 
The geo-strategic position of the NATO candidates and their willingness to 
join, prior to their formal invitation, were favorable factors, and the decisions 
made regarding membership proved to have long-term, positive consequences. 
New NATO members, particularly Romania, appreciated their new status and 
participated actively in both NATO operations and in “coalition of the willing”. 
Their equal participation in NATO-led operations and coalitions made a palpable 
contribution to both NATO and to the transatlantic relations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There were many reasons for choosing this research topic for my thesis. 
Some were personal; some were driven by the holistic perspective presented at 
the Naval Postgraduate School. 
While some may consider the way a south east European country 
performs in the international arena less relevant, for a country in the region it is 
important to make periodical and realistic evaluations of the status quo, 
especially since 1989. 
Therefore, my research evaluates the changes that NATO membership 
caused in the countries involved the last two NATO enlargements, 1999 and 
2004. This research also considers how the new members can contribute to the 
development of transatlantic relations. I chose to look at the transatlantic 
relations only from NATO’s perspective, because not all the new members are 
part of both NATO and the European Union. From all ten new entries: Estonia, 
the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, 
only Bulgaria and Romania are not yet part of both organizations. 
I argue in my research that no matter what NATO’s internal debates are 
over different issues, the end result is stronger ties within the Atlantic community. 
This was the direction new members were headed when they decided to support 
U.S. actions in Iraq. Can one imagine what the consequences would have been if 
all of Europe had decided not to support the United States in Iraq in 2003? As the 
year of this particular decision was called “annus horribilis” and transatlantic 
relations were close to the freezing point, is not difficult to assess the negative 
effects of such alternative. 
As it was much criticized by the elder NATO members, the decision of the 
newest members to support the United States in Iraq was more significant than is 
generally   thought.   Besides  the  specific  advantages  that  resulted  from  their  
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decision, the newest NATO members contributed to the maintaining and 
development of transatlantic relations in the interest of reciprocal security and 
stability. 
NATO is an organization that, for more than fifty years, has managed to 
survive profound transformation. The keys to its success seem to be a flexible 
approach and appropriate adaptation mechanisms. 
The general perception is that NATO was designed entirely as a military 
organization meant to stop the spread of the Soviet Union’s expansionist policies. 
One might argue, however, that the reason the Alliance still exists is because its 
founding principles involved more than just containment. Its survival was 
questioned at the beginning of the 1990s, since the Cold War had ended and its 
purpose seemed futile. But events that followed proved its continuing necessity. 
The issue of NATO relevance emerged due to the fate of its counterpart, the 
Warsaw Pact which was established in 1955, six years after NATO. The Pact lost 
its importance soon after the rise of the 1989 liberation movements in the former 
Soviet sphere of influence, and it was expected that NATO would have the same 
fate. However, it did not. 
The natural questions are: what are the elements that make this 
organization viable even though the security environment has changed 
dramatically? What are the bonding materials that keep the member states 
together? In cases of strong disagreements, why are they not going separate 
ways? Moreover, why are other countries enthusiastic about joining the NATO 
club? Why are they still knocking at NATO’s door? Is it a mirage or just a 
necessity? Can the new entries make a difference? Can they really contribute to 
the well-being of the Alliance or are they just safeguarding its farthest borders? 
In the early’ 90s most political commentators were forecasting a gloomy 
future for the Alliance. The international relations “landscape” had changed so 
much after 1989 that a redefinition of the international order was believed 
necessary. The United States, as a victor of the Cold War, pursued an 
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institutional approach that remained consistent until the Iraq invasion in 2003, 
when U.S. hegemonic behavior blossomed. 
Until 2003 NATO was one of the most important vehicles of the 
institutional international order. It was perceived as the sole guarantor of security 
and stability in a very dynamic environment. Article 10 of the Alliance maintains 
an open invitation for any European state to join the organization as long as the 
principles and values that define NATO are internalized and respected. 
Beginning in 1991, NATO’s roles and missions had been changed to 
make it more suitable within a constantly changing environment, by the Strategic 
Concept (Rome 1991 and Washington 1999) and the enlargement process 
(Madrid 1997 and Prague 2002). The last two waves of enlargement, the fourth 
and the fifth in NATO history, were the most unusual ones due to the former 
status of the involved countries. They can be divided into three categories: 
former Soviet satellite states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, 
and Poland) new states born as a result of the disintegration of another state 
(Slovakia and Slovenia), and new states born as a result of gaining their 
independence from the former USSR (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). 
The major question of this paper is: How do the new countries contribute 
to a better Alliance, especially when issues are divisive its unity? 
My research is divided into three parts. 
The first chapter describes the security concerns of central and 
southeastern European countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
communist system. It charts the preparations and the political arrangements that 
led to successive NATO enlargements and the raison d'être behind those 
decisions. I highlight some of the main events that not only mark the relations in 
southeast Europe but also had important implications for transatlantic relations. I 
show how in the process of accession, Poland arose as a platoon leader, a 
status which was later put to the test. 
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The second chapter focuses on the second wave of NATO enlargement 
and its implications on transatlantic links. A comparison among the states of the 
second wave enlargement reveals Romania as platoon leader, whose status was 
later put to the test. 
The third chapter concentrates on Romania and its understanding of the 
actualities of transatlantic relations. More important, this chapter analyzes 
Romania’s perception of the benefits of active participation in the war against 
terrorism and the implications of that for the transatlantic link.  
The conclusions reached in the paper support my general hypothesis: in 
spite of appearances, most countries, given the opportunity, can make a 
contribution to the development of the transatlantic relations. 
From its beginning, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was what Henry 
Kissinger called it a ‘‘troubled partnership.’’ NATO had experiened a succession 
of serious crises: Suez Canal Crisis (1956), French president Charles de Gaulle’s 
challenge to U.S. leadership of the Alliance (1958–1966), the Vietnam War, 
United States–West European differences over détente with the Soviet Union 
during the1970s and the deployment of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces in 
the late 70s to early 80s. Considering the pressure those crises placed on the 
Alliance, the predictions made in American foreign policy about an imminent 
transatlantic divorce do not seem so out of place. The history of repeated 
transatlantic disagreements reached an all-time low point during the Bush 
Administration between 2002 and 2003. President George W. Bush made his 
first move toward reconciliation at the Brussels NATO summit in February 2005.  
The interdependence of Europe and North America, the 
transatlantic link, was forged from the bitter experience of the first 
half of the 20th century that witnessed two world wars, a devastating 
worldwide economic depression, and the rise of Communism.  
The building of a strong, peaceful and prosperous Europe since 
World War II is one of the greatest triumphs of American diplomacy 
and  the  current success  of European integration would have been  
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unthinkable without America’s strong commitment to European 
security through NATO and the role of Europe's transnational 
institutions.  
After the Second World War, since 1947 when George Marshall 
offered his vision for post-war reconstruction, the transatlantic 
partnership has helped to build a more peaceful and prosperous 
Europe. The great conflicts of the first half of the 20th century were 
followed by the Cold War competition of the century's second half, 
which created the divisions of that time East versus West, the 
Soviet Union versus the United States, the Warsaw Pact versus 
NATO, communism versus capitalism.  
Fifteen years ago the artificial line that divided Europe, drawn at 
Yalta, was erased. Germany has been reunified, the EU and NATO 
have embraced new members from Central and Eastern Europe, 
and Russia stands with the United States and Europe as a partner 
not a rival. 
The 21st century is less than five years old, but already two major 
events have had and will continue to have important effects on the 
transatlantic link. The first, of course, was the attack by al-Qaeda 
on September 11, 2001 and the second transforming event was the 
Iraq war, which plunged the Alliance for a time into a crisis of 
confidence.1
Historical examples of the crises that the Alliance encountered are also 
proof of NATO’s potential to overcome differences, as stated in the Washington 
Treaty:   
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage 
and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to 
promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are 
resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the 
preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this 
North Atlantic Treaty.  
 
1 “The U.S. international strategy and the transatlantic link,” Betsy L Anderson, chief of 
mission of the U.S. Embassy in Sweden; remarks delivered at University of Gotland with the 
occasion of the Seminar on European and International Security, 15 September 2004. 
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The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations will assist the Party or Parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the 
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use 
of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area.2
 
 
2 Excerpt from the North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, 4 April 1949.
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II. POST-COLD WAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND NATO 
ENLARGEMENT 
What was called, relatively recently, the “first” NATO enlargement is only a 
time-related construct. The reality is that, chronologically, it was the fourth 
enlargement since NATO’s establishment in 1949. The first such enlargement 
included states that were behind the Iron Curtain for almost fifty years, and re-
born after the political changes of the early 1990s. 
After the communist collapse, the security environment in Europe 
declined, especially in southeast Europe. States formerly held together by 
coercion or treaty provisions developed centripetal tendencies that evolved into 
declarations of independence. The disintegration of states, ethnic revivals, 
rivalries for resources, and nostalgia for the “big” and powerful state became 
sources of instability and conflict. On top of this instability, the Warsaw Pact, the 
only institutional framework that supposedly could provide security and stability in 
the area, was dissolved in 1991. The rapid evolution from a communist to an ex-
communist country status triggered a search for an organization that could 
guarantee their security needs. Their efforts were oriented toward NATO as the 
only organization strong enough to provide security in a much-tormented region, 
where countries were unprepared to deter or counteract new, asymmetric threats 
on their own.3   
Despite the inherent difficulties that most of the former communist states 
have had, NATO maintained the “open door” policy outlined in Article 10 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty. This policy gave central and southern European states the 
incentive to approach NATO as the most viable and the sole security 
organization that could answer their security dilemmas after the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact.  
A. SECURITY MILIEU AFTER 1990 
 
3 Joseph Rothchild and Nancy Wingfield, “Return to Diversity: A political history of East 
Central Europe since World War II,” Oxford University Press 2000. 
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The balance of power that characterized Cold War relations suffered a 
fatal blow in late 1989. Its sudden demise enabled the victor of the Cold War to 
assume the primary role in redesigning the new world order. Regional security, 
which used to be approached as an independent factor, gained much of the 
attention of the United States and Western European countries after 1990. This 
was due to the dramatic events in the former Yugoslavia and the very unstable 
political situation in Russia in the early 1990s. The breakdown of Yugoslavia and 
the coup d’état in Russia, along with its gradual process of formal “separation” 
from the central government, were the gravest events since World War II.  
This high level of insecurity was a natural environment for arms and drug 
trafficking (some of the countries developed constant routes of trafficking toward 
Western Europe), organized crime, and corruption at the highest level. In 
addition, this insecurity soon became fertile terrain for the infiltration of terrorist 
organization elements. Despite the security umbrella provided by NATO to its 
members, the threats grew closer and became less conventional. To address 
these concerns, Western liberal democracies began to push for and speed up 
the democratization of the formerly communist regions. 
Sometimes, evidence gathered from different sources gives the 
impression of a lack of authentic willingness on the part of powerful actors to 
succeed in these actions. After exhausting all democratic means for preventing 
conflicts, forcefully intervening in the name of democratic values, and imposing 
the terms and conditions of a peace settlement, conflict can still arise. This was 
the case in the former Yugoslavia, where, despite serious peacemaking efforts, 
war broke out when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in 1991. 
The Yugoslav National Army after engaging in two short wars with the newly 
independent countries lost and was forced to retreat into its own territory. 
Unfortunately, the declaration of independence then made by Bosnia i 
Herzegovina resulted in a bitter and prolonged war. From 1992 until the 1995 
Dayton Peace Agreements, Europeans witnessed a re-creation of the horrors of 
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Nazi concentration camps, culminating with Srebrenica in 1995, where 
approximately 7,000 men and young boys were killed.4  
When viewed within the larger context of the international arena, the 
decade of the 1990s is notable for a critical repositioning of countries according 
to an imbalance of power. 
B. THE WINNER TAKES ALL 
 In the early 1990s, regional issues were mainly related to the violent 
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the effects of the disintegration of the 
former USSR. 
In the early’ 90s, the United States, the indisputable winner in the Cold 
War, was “forced” to prove its potential as a world leader because of the 
increasing number of hot spots on the world map. Southeast Europe was no 
exception. The former Yugoslavia had an unfortunate destiny. Being the most 
progressive and market-oriented state from the former communist block, 
Yugoslavia had a special status in the Euro-Atlantic community. A change in 
leadership in 1980 with the death of Joseph Broz Tito corresponded to a change 
in the international community’s perception of the Yugoslavian federation.        
Traditionally, Yugoslavia represented a particular interest for the United 
States and, to a lesser degree, for the Western European countries. The early 
decoupling of Yugoslavian authorities (1948) from the Soviets was perceived by 
the Allies as an encouraging sign of a break in the unity of the communist block. 
It was also considered an opportunity to pursue an anti-Soviet policy right under 
their nose, in defiance of the Soviet tight surveillance. Whatever had motivated 
the Western Europeans countries and the United States to favor the Yugoslav 
regime before 1989 was no longer an issue. In 1980, after Tito’s death, a much 
more radical leader came to power: Slobodan Milosevic. He managed to 
suppress every remnant of the autonomy that ethnic groups had had before the 
fall of communism. After 1990, people still living within the boundaries 
 
4 Steven L Lamy, “The Dutch in Srebenica: A noble mission fails,” The Institute for the Study 
of Diplomacy 2001. 
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established by World War II regained the right to decide their own destiny under 
their own desired authority. The result was a centripetal trend that took over the 
country. A counter measure envisaged by the Belgrad central authorities was to 
pit ethnic groups against one another. The authorities put into practice 
aggressive policies by abusing on the national sentiments, instigating people to 
commit ethnic cleansing, reactivating their memory scars, and overvaluing the 
national pride of a “Great Serbia.” In retrospect, Yugoslavia showed all the signs 
of a perfect candidate for a war theater. Now it is relatively easy to identify what 
went wrong, and to see that the real motives were rooted deep in an intricate 
system of national and international interests. A situation that results in war is 
generally considered a diplomatic failure. Who’s to blame for this failure?      
Between 1980 and 1989 ethnic clashes were noted in such regions as 
Kosovo, where any outside intervention was inconceivable. But after the 1989, 
ethnic clashes continued on the background of country disintegration. In such 
condition, one can not help wondering why did not the Europeans and the 
Americans stop this self-destructive trend before the situation became 
unstoppable? Prior to 1989, an intervention was simply not an option to be 
considered, and thus after the end of Cold War, it was just a matter of time until 
conflict erupted.  
In response to my question, there are two alternatives to consider.  
First, early warning elements were either ignored or went unnoticed. As 
America was unwilling to intervene, no matter the cost, the Europeans should 
have done more to prevent the violent outcomes. Having neighbor countries 
involved in an armed conflict or on the verge of conflict is a threat to the 
surrounding countries as well. Experience shows that nearby conflict has a 
tendency to spill over national boundaries. Besides, a war like situation is liable 
to result in external intervention and arbitrary post-war settlements. The post-WW 
II settlements led to the establishment of Yugoslavian federation. Their arbitrary’ 
character was one of the causes of the post-1990 wars. The threats posed by 
Yugoslavia were multifaceted, not just military, but also economic and social. For 
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instance, consider the economic embargo imposed on Serbia, Yugoslavia’s 
successor, which was intended to isolate and weaken the country. However, the 
embargo affected not only Serbia, but also neighboring countries, particularly 
Romania and Bulgaria, which depended on the commercial trade on the Danube 
Delta.  
The second possible answer to my question is the lack of political 
willingness on the part of Western democracies to remedy the situation. They 
were much more concerned with savoring their victories in the Cold War, and the 
Gulf War which were the basis for a new configuration of the world order. The 
attention of the most powerful countries was focused elsewhere. According to 
John Ikenberry, a war and its aftermath help the victors consolidate their world 
position.5 Ikenberry concludes that the history of humanity particularly registers 
wars that become turning points and allow the winner to shape the world order 
and influence politics: 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919, 1945. The type of conflict that 
took place in the Balkans was arguably the type that could assure primacy in 
world relations. However, the title of world leader is acquired not by fighting big 
wars, but by winning smaller conflicts. Yugoslavia’s problems revealed 
vulnerability of both Europe and America.  
Another aspect of the southeast Europe scene after 1989 was a rapid 
decline of the economic situation. The former communist countries had formed 
an economic framework that shaped their national economies. Once the 
framework was dissolved that is the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 
COMECON, so were their economic ties. 
The economy is still most negative element countries during transitional 
period. The collapse of the communist system had a domino effect across the 
entire ex-communist block and in all domains of their cooperation. The economy 
suffered the most because the market in which the countries usually operated 
suddenly disappeared. Along with this, the currency dropped in value 
 
5 John Ikenberry, “After victory: institutions, strategic restraint and the rebuilding of the order 
after major wars,” Princeton University Press, 2001. 
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dramatically in just a couple of years. Rapidly, lifetime savings were not worth a 
dime. Unemployment grew dangerously and the living standard seemed 
comparable to the communist period, with a few exceptions. This economic 
instability characterized the first two years and, in some respects, the following 
years of the post-Cold War development. Against the background of this 
economic and social turmoil financial schemes created an illusion of a better, 
more luxurious life with no effort.  
In the international arena, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 received 
prompt and undivided attention from the main actors on the both sides of the 
Atlantic. Within transatlantic relations there was no sign of potential 
disagreement. The Iraq intervention was a clear-cut situation for the allies. The 
intervention against Iraq was unanimously considered a legitimate response to 
the aggression and an immediate and, thus, forceful response faced no veto from 
any member of the UN Security Council. Although NATO was not formally used 
in the military operations, member countries sent their troops to the theater, 
bringing valuable experience to the intervention. 
Regarding organizational changes, NATO had to reform from within due to 
outside changes in the early 1990s. Although NATO was originally a military 
organization, the political component gradually became predominant. The brisk 
adaptation of the organization in the face of changes seems irrefutable proof of 
the validity of the inner mechanisms that propel the Alliance. This kind of proof 
supports the assertions by those groups of political commentators who did not, 
and do not support the dissolution of the Alliance.  
NATO changed its strategic framework in order to regulate its defining 
principles in keeping with its actions. The first Strategic Concept was presented 
early in November 1991 at the Rome summit. The document acknowledged and 
welcomed the “profound political changes” which were then reflected them in 
further definitive actions. Another challenge was the increasing prospect of 
multidirectional threats which are much less predictable. NATO must be prepared 
to face any challenge that might arise. Some threats were identified as “adverse 
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consequences of instability…and serious economic and political difficulties, 
including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes.”6 Some concerns were raised 
after the 1990-1991 Gulf War by NATO strategists who drew the attention of 
decision makers to the importance of maintaining a constant level of security and 
stability at Europe’s periphery. The underlying objective of the Alliance remains, 
however, the same: to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members. 
What had to change was the approach; that had to encompass a broader 
typology of threat. The fundamental operating principle also remained the same: 
“common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in 
support of the indivisibility of security of all its members.”7 The attributes that 
characterized the 1991 Strategic Concept were flexibility, mobility, improvement, 
adequateness, and effectiveness.  
Eight years later (1999), NATO chose to again refine the Strategic 
Concept. What were the changes that triggered this redefinition? 
In 1992 war broke out in Bosnia i Herzegovina. In fact, a state of war was 
the prevailing condition throughout the Yugoslavian region until the Dayton 
Peace Agreements in 1995. In 1993, the Republic of Slovakia declared its 
independence from the Czech Republic. In 1994, NATO launched an initiative 
called the Partnership for Peace, whose purpose was to bring non-NATO 
countries closer to the Alliance and also to tailor their military capabilities toward 
interoperability with the goal of full membership.  
In the same year, the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) was 
endorsed by NATO. The concept encircled the objectives proposed in the first 
Strategic Concept: a more flexible multinational force able to respond adequately 
to a broad range of threats. In 1995 NATO had its first out-of-area operation, in 
Bosnia i Herzegovina. NATO air-strikes were a response to the parties’ non 
 
6 NATO Handbook, “The Alliance Strategic Concept”; text also available at: 
www.nato.int/docu/basicstxt/b911108a.html, accessed 10 January, 2005  
7 NATO Handbook, “The Alliance Strategic Concept”; text also available at: 
www.nato.int/docu/basicstxt/b911108a.html, accessed 10 January, 2005  
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compliance with a cease-fire imposed by the United Nations. NATO acted at the 
specific request of the UN. Later, based on another UN request, NATO assumed 
a further role in implementing the military aspects of the Dayton Peace 
Agreements and thus contributing to the reconstruction of the state. The two 
missions undertaken by NATO were the Implementation Force (IFOR) followed 
by the Stabilization Force (SFOR). They lasted from 1995 to 2004, when the 
SFOR concluded its mission. SFOR was handed over to a European mission, 
ALTHEA, which is mainly focused on the reconstruction and the development of 
the economic mechanisms, while also maintaining the level of security and 
stability.  
Signs of transatlantic disagreement began to attract public notice in the 
late 1990s. Lack of a common enemy, differences of opinion on a second out-of-
area military operation (Kosovo in 1999), and a steady increase of U.S. 
domination in transatlantic relations brought traditional Allies to the brink of 
divorce. The first visible and undeniable sign of discord resulted from NATO’s 
Kosovo air strikes in 1999. Allies did not share the same opinions about NATO’s 
forceful intervention. Following the successes in Bosnia i Herzegovina by the 
Implementation Force and Stabilization Force the Alliance assumed the 
prerogative to duplicate them in Kosovo without the endorsement of a UN 
Security Council resolution. Not surprisingly, this created tension among allies. 
Most of the Western European partners raised concerns about the legitimacy of 
the Kosovo operations, and were visibly disturbed and frustrated by the United 
States’ self-assumed leading role.   
Although the first post-communist enlargement of NATO was a moment of 
joy and pride for the new entries, it was a disappointing and frustrating moment 
for the applicants who were still on the “outside.” In the meantime, the New World 
Order began to take a more recognizable shape. Despite the Western allies’ 
unwillingness to yield to any concession in friendly confrontation with the most 
offensive U.S. realist strategies, no strong and firm position was taken. Some 
Allies, especially France and Germany, openly showed and declared their 
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discontent with U.S. practices. However, their political statements were not 
backed up by definite measures, military or economic. 
The first turning point in transatlantic relations was marked by the 
1997/1999 NATO enlargement. In 1997, at the Madrid summit, three ex-
communist countries were invited to begin accession discussions. These 
countries were Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The decision was 
politically driven rather than militarily, affirmation which down the road was 
confirmed by those states’ behavior and attitudes.   
In April 1999, NATO celebrated fifty years of existence. It was a moment 
of reformulation of the basic principles of the Alliance. However, the eight years 
following the end of the Cold War were marked by a series of events that 
permanently changed both the Alliance and international relations.  
C. COLD-WAR WAVES OF ENLARGEMENTS 
Soon after the end of World War II the next logical and natural step was a 
division of power among the victors. Within five years the intentions of all sides 
became clear. Western Europe, which came out of the war in ruins, was 
vulnerable in the face of Soviet “aggression.” America had to choose: either 
leave the Europeans to deal with the Soviets on their own, or not. The solution 
chosen was very pragmatic and to some degree selfish. Europe and America 
had positions that were mutually beneficial. Every helpful action that the United 
States took in the years immediately after WW II pointed in this direction. 
The North Atlantic Treaty was established in 1949 with twelve founding countries: 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States of 
America.8 Following the geographic lines of the founding states, the Alliance 
strengthened certain parts of Europe. On its northwestern flank were Denmark, 
Iceland, Norway, and the United Kingdom; on its western flank were Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands; on its southwestern flank were Italy 
and Portugal. This left the central and southeastern flanks to the Soviets. None of 
 
8 NATO Handbook, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001 
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those European countries played a leading role in any aspect of the post war 
European affairs. Therefore, in the following years, NATO pursued Article 10-
type policies with the goal of increasing its effectiveness in a potential conflict 
with the Soviet block.  
In 1952 Greece and Turkey became NATO members, although their 
differences over Cyprus were well known. By accepting these two countries, 
NATO achieved two objectives in one shot. First, Europe’s south flank was 
reinforced. Second, the Alliance was able to implement pivotal deterrence over 
them. In a 1975 case, the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey 
as a result of the Cyprus invasion,9  in which Turkey used U.S. military 
equipment. 
The geo-strategic positions of both countries were additional criteria 
considered in accepting them into the Alliance. Their acceptance served NATO-
member countries’ interest in controlling access to the Balkans and the Middle 
East and protecting trade routes. The importance of the Alliance’s flanks 
fluctuated. The increase or decrease of their importance depended on the 
specifics of the environment and countries’ interests. During the Cold War, for 
example, the importance of the southern flank declined. It was revived early in 
the ‘90s with the Gulf War, when military strategists were forced to reconsider 
their plans.      
It is true that during the Cold War the security environment was different. 
However, the Alliance brought under its umbrella two countries that, historically, 
had fought or maintained a high level of animosity. The cold calculus of costs and 
benefits, which must have been the rationale behind the decision, was doubled 
by accomplishing a fragile balance of power. The Alliance took an “either we take 
them or they will” approach. The decision was largely defined by the Soviet threat  
 
9 Specific UN documents did not acknowledge it as an invasion, but as an intervention.   
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and its embedded competition and perpetual confrontation. Additional 
considerations were related to the sea openings and the economic routes from 
the Middle East. Statistically, 
Mediterranean countries provide 24% of the European Union 
member states energy imports, 32% of the imports of natural gas 
and 27% of oil imports. However, there is a disproportion among 
the EU member states who are reliant on the producers of the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean; Spain, France, Italy, Greece 
and Portugal derive 24% of their oil supplies from their region; 
Spain, Greece, France, Italy, and Portugal derive 42% of their gas 
supplies from the region. Europe is linked to the supply from the 
region via the Transmed pipeline carrying Algerian gas to Italy, via 
Tunisia and to the Maghreb-Europe pipeline to carry Algerian gas, 
via Morocco, to Spain and Portugal. An electricity interconnection 
has also been on stream between Morocco and Spain since 
1995.10  
By the middle of the ‘90s, NATO strategists considered it appropriate to 
redefine the importance of the region due to its recent evolution. At the 1994 
summit, the Alliance made public the guidelines that would shape the Alliance’s 
policies in the region. The U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joseph 
Kruzel, presented them.  
Today the real threat to European Security comes not from the 
northern region, where much of the attention of the Alliance is 
focused, but in the south, where existing conflicts and potential for 
catastrophe are pervasive…for NATO, the Mediterranean, rather 
then the Elbe, has become the front line for a variety of security 
issues ranging from the spread of extremism and uncontrolled 
migration to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction…11  
The next NATO enlargement was even more interesting than the first. In 
1955 West Germany had been accepted as a member. Negotiations had begun 
in 1950.  In the decade since the end of war, it became more evident than ever 
that a Europe without Germany was weak and vulnerable to the Soviets. 
Besides, there were several occasions when America was not focused on 
 
10 Fotios Moustakis, “The Greek-Turkish relationship and NATO”, Frank Cass, 2003 
11 Ibid 9.  
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Europe: the establishment of Israel in 1948, followed by restlessness in the 
region and North Korea’s 1950 attack on South Korea. These events 
demonstrated the necessity and importance of having a much more self-reliant 
Europe. West Germany had to be part of it to balance the USSR’s intentions to 
monopolize the country. In fact, a few months after West Germany’s acceptance 
in NATO, the USSR signed the Warsaw Treaty with the East German authorities, 
thus conferring state prerogatives. 
Beginning in the 1950s for the first time in its history, NATO added an 
essential political role to its traditional military function. This new political role 
focused first on the integration and supervision of Federal Republic of Germany. 
It then broadened to include maintaining stability in postwar Europe and 
maintaining some balance among the European powers.  
During the Cold War, enlargement decisions were based on the needs of 
both military strategies and foreign policies, policies that focused on Soviet 
containment. By the late 1960s, confrontation between the United States and the 
Soviets occurred throughout Europe: in 1956, the Hungarian upraising; in 1961, 
the Berlin crisis; in 1968, Prague spring. In the late ‘70s and ‘80s, the U.S.-Soviet 
confrontation migrated to unsettled areas, such as the U.S. war in Vietnam and 
the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Those two conflicts were perceived as indirect 
confrontations between two superpowers for gains in areas of influence, but also 
for pride and reputation. The relative “peace” of the Cold War signaled the 
installation of a certain comforting situation agreed to by the two blocks. East-
West relations were close to the null point. In a bipolar world the distribution of 
power between equal parties is reduced to the “null hypothesis.” Conversely, 
between unequal parties, power is measured by the distribution of influence.12
The third NATO enlargement took place in 1982, when Spain was 
accepted as a member. At the time, Spain was emerging from a transition period 
(1975-1982), a civil war (1936-1939), and the Franco dictatorship (1939-1975). 
This enlargement was not as spectacular as the previous ones. Spain was 
 
12 T. RISSE-KAPPEN, “Cooperation among democracies” Princeton University, 1995 
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experiencing internal difficulties with ETA and its successive attacks. The country 
was also involved in international disputes with the United Kingdom and Morocco 
over the Gibraltar Strait.  
D. FIRST WAVE OF ENLARGEMENT AFTER THE COLD WAR 
As early as 1995, NATO conducted a comprehensive study on 
enlargement that focused on central and southeastern European countries. The 
study outlined steps aspirant countries had to take in order to be eligible for 
membership. The steps included compliance with the basic principles of the 
Washington Treaty and fulfillment of certain political, economic, and military 
criteria. Among the multitude of criteria, a few were specifically designed for 
countries that had a communist legacy. The criteria included the existence of 
functioning democracy, a market economy, willingness to solve any dispute with 
neighbor countries, respect for minority rights, and willingness to contribute 
militarily and achieve interoperability and to create consolidated democratic civil-
military relations.13
The first post-Cold War enlargement was a decision full of symbolic 
importance. The enlargement study reflects throughout the Alliance’s perception 
on Europe. The Yalta lines that divided the continent had to be erased and a new 
security architecture had to be created. To some extent, this enlargement was 
compensation to states that had recently come out of a harsh fifty-year reality.  
Let us take them separately.  
Hungary’s transition from communism started in the late 1980s when the 
Hungarian economy began to take small but steady steps toward market-
regulated mechanisms. These changes were approved by the National Assembly 
and were favored by the Hungarian communist party. Political changes, however, 
came later. In 1990, free elections were held for the first time in almost fifty years. 
Compared to Poland and the Czech Republic, Hungary showed more political 
and economic stability, a circumstance that encouraged foreign investments.  
 
13 “Enlargement, what does it means?” text available at: 
www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/in_practice.htm  
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And, in a relatively short time, Hungary achieved spectacular economic growth. 
By early 1995, however, these gains had been diminished by differences 
between the socialist government led by Gyula Horn and the opposition led by 
Istvan Csurka (after the death of Janos Antall in 1992)14 over the privatization 
issue. The national currency was rapidly devaluated. Unpopular actions taken by 
the Hungarian government -- including cuts in welfare programs, measures taken 
to reduce the foreign debt, and a budget deficit -- resulted in reduced economic 
growth. In early 1996, the authorities announced an austerity budget and welfare 
program.  
One of the criteria required by NATO was the development and 
maintenance of good relations with neighbor countries, with whom the issue of 
minority rights was always on the agenda. A major step toward confidence-
building and reassurance was the Hungarian-Romanian friendship treaty, which 
stands as a model in other cases. After negotiations, the treaty was signed in 
1995 and ratified a year later.  
The market economy that began to develop as early as 1980, flourished 
after 1989, as a result of the U.S. aid program. Between 1990 and 1995, the 
Hungarian economy received an influx of U.S. aid totaling more than $217 million 
dollars. In addition, the first foreign investor in the Hungarian economy was the 
United States.15
Czechoslovakia’s transition from communism to democracy was one of 
the most peaceful on the European continent. Its “velvetiness” also characterized 
its 1993 from Slovakia. Of the entire block of communist countries, only the 
Czech Republic managed to design and apply such a successful economic 
transition, through the use of voucher system and with the help of U.S. aid, 
totaling $145 million dollars.16 Its foreign policy was marked by thorny relations 
with its biggest northern neighbor, as a result of the expulsion of the Sudeten 
 
14 Michael J. Faber, “Hungary the party system from 1963 to 2000,” research paper (June-
August 2000), University of Northwestern. 
15 U.S. Congressional  report on Hungary 
16 U.S. Congressional report on the Czech Republic 
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Germans after World War II. These relations seemed to be on the path toward 
conciliation, as both sides signaled that they were ready to bury their historical 
resentment.  
On an optimistic but moderate note Czech President, Vaclav Havel 
expressed his country’s wish to join the Alliance: “while the European Union 
focuses on political and economic integration, NATO constitutes an irreplaceable 
instrument for collective defense of these values.”17  
Poland was the biggest country to enter in the first wave of enlargement in 
every aspect: population, territory and military capabilities. The problems to be 
overcome were in accordance with its size. Poland’s foreign relations had been 
influenced by the Solidarity movement during final years of the Cold War. This 
increased the trust of Western democracies that Poland could develop opposition 
forces strong enough to overthrow the communists. The Solidarity movement’s 
very existence offered a good chance for change.  
The U.S. Department of Commerce designated Poland a “significant 
market” soon after 1990. Consequently, Poland received substantial U.S. aid, 
during the same time span as Hungary and the Czech Republic (1990-1995) that 
totaled $805 million dollars. In addition, in 1993 U.S. exports came close to a 
billion dollars. Subsequently, Poland’s determination to achieve NATO’s 
requirements was proportional with the level foreign aid. Among the foreign 
investors, the United States held one of the highest positions.18  
Poland’s political leaders made several declarations both before and after 
their invitation to join NATO that described their perception of the event. The 
foreign minister at the time, Bronislaw Geremek, explained publicly the reason for 
Poland’s  desire  to  join NATO: “is an alliance which has put its immense military  
 
17 Vaclav Havel, “A Chance to Stop Exporting Wars and Violence,” Transitions, December, 
1997. 
18 The numbers used were retrieved from Congressional Report Support (text available at 
www.fas.org/) 
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might in the service of fundamental values and principles that we share. NATO 
can make Europe safe for democracy. No other organization can replace the 
Alliance in this role.”19     
It is fairly easy to make assessments of countries contribution based on 
the financial figures. They are good indicators of country’s intentions and point 
out the direction where the country is focusing its resources.  Foreign aid helped 
the countries to channel their efforts is certain directions. Therefore, it can be 
deduced that the policies of positive inducements were more productive than 
using coercion. This was the case of the three new NATO members, which 
responded better to financial incentives rather then using means of coercion.    
In spite of NATO’s relatively early preoccupation with the construction of a 
“whole and free” Europe, the Alliance’s best action took place in 1994. During 
that year, the Partnership for Peace program was launched as a tool to carry out 
multiple tasks. The tasks were devoted to achieving the political goals NATO 
aspirants were required to attain, as well as the acquisition of a certain degree of 
military interoperability and the promotion of NATO’s norms, practices, and 
values. The Partnership for Peace encouraged the growth of democratic values 
in central and eastern Europe. The increased importance of NATO’s political role 
was demonstrated at the London summit in 1990, when the Alliance invited 
several communist countries to send military personnel as liaison officers. 
Gradually, the level of cooperation increased. In 1991, NATO invited all the 
former Warsaw Pact countries to become members of the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council, later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The newly 
formed NACC’s tasks were to promote cooperation and help the democratization 
processes in central and Eastern Europe.  
The NATO enlargement process was simultaneous with its transformation 
from a Cold War military organization into a leading politico-military organization 
in a unipolar world facing a wide range of threats. This multilateral role became 
 
19 Bronislaw Geremek, Address on the occasion of accession protocols to the North Atlantic 
Treaty, December, 16, 1997. 
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even more evident when, in 1994 NATO also launched the Mediterranean 
Dialogue, an initiative that opened lines of communications and cooperation with 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunis, Alger, Mauritania, and Israel. 
In this context, the Madrid summit in 1997 represented the natural and 
logical next step. Although the new entries -- Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic -- did not completely meet NATO’s requirements, in 1999 they became 
full members. During the two years between NATO’s invitation and the 
Parliaments’ ratification of the treaties, the Alliance conducted periodic 
assessments of the new entries, the sine qua non condition of existence in a 
collective security organization.  
Although the first wave of enlargement was never acknowledged as either 
a failure or a complete success, the general opinion of the older allies was that it 
was too soon and too politically dictated, rather than militarily and economically 
substantiated. Thus, the first NATO enlargement was accompanied by a lot of 
criticism; from both outside and inside. Critics went as far as calling it the “most 
fateful error of American foreign policy in the entire post-cold era, due to 
American support of the second wave of enlargement.”20 In addition, NATO’s 
move toward the east could “inflame nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic 
tendencies in Russian’s public opinion.”21 To some extent the criticism was right, 
because Russia, the USSR successor, did not regard favorably the continuous 
spread of its former enemy.  
Another critique of the first enlargement process, which is applicable to the 
second wave as well, concerns the decision process. The consensus NATO 
required became much more difficult to achieve when the number of members 
increased. There were a few proposals to reconsider the decision-making 
methodology; however, none of them were consistent with NATO principles.  
 
20 George Kennan 
21 Bronislaw Geremek, Address on the occasion of accession protocols to the North Atlantic 
Treaty, December, 16 1997. 
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It has been said that in the 1990s NATO became the vehicle of 
democratization in central and east Europe. That may be so in the sense that 
aspirant countries had a permanent incentive to acquire the necessary 
membership requirements. The first three countries, for example, were 
committed to democracy long before the “NATO carrot was dangled before 
them.”22  
NATO went through several stages of self-evaluation after the end of the 
Cold War. The main goal was to define NATO’s current role and the first wave of 
enlargement was one of those moments. Cold War history shows that 
membership, although declared so, was not embedded only in NATO’s five 
criteria of acceptance. Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Spain are living proof of the 
distinctiveness of the membership decision. Their membership was dictated by 
strategic interests rather than by compliance with the rules. “Greece, Turkey, 
Portugal and Spain all experienced periods of undemocratic rule and manifested 
poor human rights records subsequent to becoming NATO members.”23  
What good does NATO membership bring?  
Beyond its security purposes, the Alliance has the ability through its 
institutional mechanisms to deter any potential conflict that may arise between 
members. Thus NATO’s very existence and presence are guaranteed 
opportunity for peaceful resolutions to disputes. A good example of how NATO 
exerted pivotal deterrence was Greece and Turkey during the Cold War. In spite 
of their occasionally mishaps, the two countries managed to maintain a satisfying 
level of cooperation due to NATO’s influence.  
Post-Cold War examples of good neighborly relations are Romania and 
Hungary, who signed a friendship treaty in 1996 in spite of traditional thorny 
relations. Among many signed treaties this one stands out as a model to follow 
for similar situations. There have been many others benefits of the cooperative 
policies pursued by NATO aspirant states that can be used as models of 
 
22 Dan Reiter “Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy,” International 
Security, 2001, volume 24, issue 4. 
23  Rebecca Moore, “Europe Whole and free: NATO’s political mission for the 21st Century”. 
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cooperation in other cases. Once the treaty ratified, the countries’ efforts can be 
channeled toward other areas. A treaty can also trigger other forms of 
confidence-building and reciprocal reassurance measures. 
One year after the Madrid summit, the U.S. Ambassador to Poland, H.E. 
Daniel Fried, observed: “when Poland and Hungary became more confident of 
their NATO membership, they increased their outreach to their neighbors- 
Hungary with Romania and Poland with Lithuania.” The years preceding the 
formal invitation from NATO were abundant in bilateral treaties. As Hungary and 
Romania had done Poland signed a treaty with Lithuania and Ukraine. The 
Czech Republic and Germany signed a common declaration acknowledging the 
mutual damage caused during and after World War II (Nazi crimes against the 
Czechs and the Czechoslovakian expulsion of 2.5 millions Sudeten Germans 
after the war). A political component such as a treaty that committed countries to 
mutual reassurance often resulted in a domino effect in other areas of bilateral 
cooperation, such as culture, economy, minority rights, and opens forums of 
discussion. Such cooperation reinforces the treaty itself in a feedback process.        
Indeed, these represent the modalities of developing and enhancing 
transatlantic cooperation: by maintaining a high level of trust and confidence in 
the covered area, developing good neighborly relations with non members and 
maintaining a constant and consistent level of regional cooperation. 
In a speech in 2001, former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson 
explained the allure of NATO enlargement.  
The prospect of NATO membership serves as an incentive for the 
aspirants to get their houses in order. Just look at Central and 
Eastern Europe today. NATO’s decisions to take in new members 
has sparked a wave of bilateral treaties and supported the 
resolution of border disputes. It has also encouraged many to 
establish proper democratic control over their militaries. Why? 
Because all aspirants know that if they want to join NATO they 
need to do their homework. In short, NATO’s willingness to open its 
doors has brought Europe closer together–in spirit and practice.24  
 
24 Lord Robertson, “NATO’s challenges: Illusions and realities.” speech at Chicago Council 
on Foreign Relations, 19 June 2001. 
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A real test of countries’ reliable and irreversible commitment to NATO was 
the mission in Bosnia i Herzegovina, established in 1995 at the request of the 
United Nations following Security Council Resolution No. 1031. NATO’s role was 
to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreements (annexes 1 
and 1-A). The Implementation Force (IFOR) acted under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and enjoyed the contribution of both NATO and non-NATO members.  
Hungary participated from the beginning of the mission, deploying a unit of 
engineers until 2002. The general reduction of the other forces led to a 
subsequent Hungarian reduction, which switched to a specialized unit with a 
maximum of 200 troops.  
The Czechoslovakian contribution was divided into two time periods: 
before and after Czech-Slovakian split in 1993. They operated together in the 
1992 UN-led mission, UNPROFOR, a peacekeeping mission established through 
the UN Security Council Resolution 743. After 1993, they continued to 
participate, but separately. The Czech participation was battalion-sized. They 
withdrew from the theatre in September 2001.  
The Polish contribution was, by far, the most considerable of all the new 
entry countries. Polish militaries also participated in the UNPROFOR mission, but 
they increased their contribution, forming the Nordic-Polish Battle Group 
(NORDPOL BG) in the IFOR NATO-led operation. Other contributing countries to 
the NORDPOL BG were Denmark, Sweden, and Norway with additional support 
from Finland. 
A comparison of the three countries’ contributions reveals that Poland was 
by far the lead country. Poland’s territory (a little over 300,000 square km.) its 
location, its opening to the sea and its population (close to 40 millions) are all 
bigger than those of the other new entries. Poland’s military capabilities including 
its human as well as its technological resources are palpable proofs of my 
evaluation.  One  helpful  feed-back  assessment mechanism in this regard is the  
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level of U.S. aid and investment in Poland since the beginning of the 1990s. In 
return, Poland’s commitments in NATO-led operations and other coalitions are 
direct proportional with financial aid. 
The first NATO enlargement proved to be critical both for NATO as an 
alliance and for the target countries. It symbolized the end of the West-East 
divide and the communality of countries’ interests and values. It also represented 
an added value for the NATO club, if not so much in terms of capacities, then in 
terms of supporting the allies. The younger allies understood the necessity of 
keeping transatlantic relations alive and functional, especially since the forms of 
current threats are so indefinite. 
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III. THE ROLE OF THE SECOND WAVE OF ENLARGEMENT IN 
ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION 
A. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, AND ITS POLITICAL EFFECTS 
The world has changed radically after the infamous day of September 11, 
2001. These effects continue today. The democratic world changed its policies 
and strategies following the grim preview of threats illustrated by the attacks. If 
the United States previously showed timidity in forcefully assuming the role of 
world leader, after the tragic 9/11 experience, there was no such timidity. 
Immediately after, all its allies supported the United States, denouncing the 
cruelty of the attacks and the lack of any logical reasoning in the killing of 
innocent people.        
 All the crisis response mechanisms which had seemed dormant were 
activated. The United States, for the first time in the history of the Alliance, 
invoked Article 5, which states that an attack on one member is considered an 
attack against all members. The immediate response was prompt and 
appropriate: AWACS and patrol and surveillance aircrafts spent more than 3000 
hours in American air space and NATO ships were deployed to the 
Mediterranean Sea to prevent terrorists from infiltrating Europe.25  
 The allies expressed nuanced opinions about what the intensity of 
response should be, but there was no serious disagreement. Indeed, the attacks 
were followed by a series of domestic and external measures aimed at 
increasing the level of security, extending stable and secure areas, and speeding 
up the process of designing appropriate countermeasures.       
 On the American side of the Atlantic, the immediate impact of the 
attacks was comparable to concentric circles, hitting different levels of the U.S. 
government and raising questions about the effectiveness of the early-warning 
system. The attacks triggered a thorough investigation of the intelligence 
 
25 Statement by Lord Robertson, 4 October 2001, available at: 
www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm  
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community, which brought to the surface internal deficiencies, gaps in enforcing 
laws, and a lack of inter agency communication. On the European side of the 
Atlantic, the attacks had few internal consequences, but at the supranational 
level countries pushed for a speedy common policy on terrorism.  
 The American and European responses to the 9/11 attacks were 
differently paced. Evidently, the American response was rapid and dynamic due 
to their natural perception of the events as an emergency. The European 
response was much more moderate, due to their perceptions of the attacks as a 
lower degree of emergency, which then triggered a slower setting-in-motion of 
response mechanisms. If there were any doubts or uncertainties before 9/11 
about the nature of the threats both sides of the Atlantic faced following the end 
of the Cold War, after 9/11 they simply dissipated. Russia no longer represented 
the main concern of the allies; terrorist organizations, rogue states, and the 
proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction were now recognized as the 
major threats. As President Bush said, these acts of terrorism are "yet another 
grim reminder of the lengths to which terrorists will go to threaten the civilized 
world.”26 The reality of these threats in the international realm in the twenty-first 
century requires both new military and non military perspectives and responses.  
B. PRAGUE AND THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has come a long way since 1949, 
growing from 12 member states to 26 members by 2004. NATO embodies more 
than fifty years of tradition between America and Europe in the area of security, 
an Alliance that is very difficult to annihilate by the actions of particular 
momentary leaders. As is stated in the North Atlantic Treaty prologue, the allies 
Are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and 
civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability 
and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite 
their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace 
and security. 
 
26 George Bush radio address on children hostage situation of Beslan, Russia, September 7, 
2004. 
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 These are, at large, the principles that constituted the criteria applied to 
select and admit new members in the second round of enlargement.  
 Cynical remarks were dispersed in NATO inner circles regarding the 
reasons that motivated NATO’s second wave of enlargement, the most 
substantial one in the Alliance’s history, adding Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia as new members. The remarks 
implied that the 9/11 attacks were more important than the efforts countries had 
been made in three Membership Action Plan (MAP) cycles and in the regular 
Planning and Review Process (PARP) assessments of the aspirant countries. 
Maybe the terrorist attacks contributed to the speedy process, but it was not fair 
to make such statements, which diminished and denigrated the aspirants’ efforts 
and commitments. In fact, the Bush administration put the second enlargement in 
a quite different perspective. The criteria used in the first wave of enlargement 
was still applicable, but the United States also took into consideration the 
countries’ willingness, readiness, and ability to contribute to a new NATO, that 
would address threats in a “preemptive” and “proactive” way.27 That meant out-
of-area operations, an issue that was cause for further disagreement among 
members, as has already occurred in the case of Kosovo.  
 The concerns raised by the second enlargement can be separated into 
two categories: those common to both enlargements and specific to the second 
wave. The second category refers to individual countries’ specific achievements, 
their problematic issues, their stated foreign policy objectives, regional security 
and stability and strictly Alliance-related issues. In this category were also 
included the costs of enlargement, which means financial efforts dedicated to 
reduce the military gap among the members, with the intention of reaching 
interoperability. Another specific concern was the performance of members 
accepted in the first enlargement since their accession. Those were taken as 
lessons learned for assessing potential future members. An evaluation of the first 
entries’ performance failed to satisfy the Alliance. The Czech Republic and 
 
27 US National Security Strategy, 2002 
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Hungary were major disappointments for NATO in both the Kosovo operations 
and internally. Hungary, for example, did not reach its pledged level of military 
restructuring. A high European official said: “Hungary had won the prize for the 
most disappointing new member of NATO.”28 The first wave countries’ 
performance affected the confidence of the second wave in their ability to rise to 
NATO’s level of requirements, despite U.S. financial aid and investment. Some 
voices even claimed that acceptance of the second wave equaled a lowering of 
NATO standards, especially as some of the aspirants Bulgaria, Slovakia and 
Romania were falling behind the MAP schedule in the first three years. Those 
first wave experiences caused members to push for feasible countermeasures: 
MAP, PARP and the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI), were designed to reduce 
the gap in capabilities among members, unfortunately with little success.  
 Several options were circulated regarding the number of invitees before 
the 2002 Prague summit. There were at least, three options for how many new 
members should be accepted: seven, nine, or zero. The nine-member option was 
ruled out: Albania and Macedonia were not prepared to become members. An 
option of zero invitees at Prague would have seriously damaged Alliance 
credibility. But the chosen option, seven, brought countries into the Alliance that 
were not necessarily fully prepared according to NATO’s specific requirements. 
They were, however, willing to participate in missions according to the new set of 
objectives and NATO’s newly envisioned world role.  
 In addition, the seven new countries provided a geo-strategic length that 
would enable the Alliance to rapidly deploy in conflict areas at lower costs. As the 
U.S. ambassador to NATO affirmed,  
In the wake of the shocking events of September 11, 2001, the 
world changed and NATO has changed with it. We set out a year 
and a half ago to transform everything about NATO so that it could 
help us to meet the new and daunting threat of terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction. At November’s Prague summit, 
President Bush and the NATO Leadership agreed on an ambitious, 
 
28 Celeste Wallander, “NATO’ s Price: Shape up or Shape out,” Foreign Affairs, 81, no 6 
(November/December 2002) 
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even revolutionary, reform agenda. We worked to pivot the new 
NATO from its prior inward focus on threats within Europe to a new 
outward spotlight on the recent challenges to peace in the arc of 
countries from South to Central Asia to the Middle East and North 
Africa.29   
 The November 2002 Prague summit had one of the most ambitious 
agendas of all the summits held. It brought together allies ready to redefine their 
position inside the organization, but also to reiterate organizational raison d’étre 
in an environment that required new approaches. The summit took place under a 
futurist logo, NEW ALLIES, NEW CAPABILITIES, NEW RELATIONS, which left 
little to the imagination of the envisioned Alliance transformation.  
 New Capabilities: Prague represents the moment when the past stopped 
overshadowing the present and the future. The Alliance moved from a policy of 
fixed, bipolar military response to a future as flexible, trained organization ready 
and prepared to address a wide range of threats. An improved concept of its 
capabilities was launched, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), which 
included eight areas: intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-
ground surveillance; command, control and communications; combat 
effectiveness; strategic air- and sea-lift; air-to-air refueling; and deployable 
combat support and service support units.30   
 The boldest decision taken regarding capabilities was to create a rapid 
reaction force, to be operational by 2006. The allies agreed that the NATO 
Response Force (NRF) would include a task force of 20,000 troops with sea, air, 
and land elements capable of performing the full spectrum of NATO tasks.  
 Another forward step taken at Prague involved NATO’s military 
command arrangements, which the allies agreed to make more efficient. Its 
rearrangements had a functional cause as a follow-up, based on NATO’s Kosovo 
experience in targeting decisions and the different requirements posed by the 
 
29 Nicolas Burns, “The new NATO: healing the rift”, speech at the Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation, 2003 
30 NATO after Prague, text available at NATO library, www.nato.int/
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war on terrorism. As a result, now there is a single Strategic Command for 
Operations in Belgium supported by two Joint Force Commands able to generate 
both a land-based and a sea-based Combined Joint Task Force capability and 
one Strategic Command for Transformation headquartered in the United States. 
As a countermeasure to terrorism, NATO developed concepts of combating 
nuclear, chemical, and biological threats. These concepts were aimed at 
increasing the allies’ preparedness and capacity for crisis response. 
 New Relations: Relations between NATO and the European Union were 
considered strategic; its relations with Russia were on an upward trend as well. 
And the successes in Bosnia i Herzegovina favored a potential joining of the 
country in the Partnership for Peace, along with the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. In this context, the special contributions of Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Slovenia were mentioned as modalities to strengthen stability and security in the 
region.    
 New Allies: At the Prague summit, NATO invited seven countries 
ranging from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea to join. NATO’s history had never 
registered a more robust enlargement than this one. In spite of all the criticism 
that might be raised, the addition of the seven countries extended NATO’s 
secure area and brought specific contributions as well as a general defense 
contribution according to each country’s military capabilities. After the first 
enlargement, NATO specialists had launched the Membership Action Plan in 
1999 as a road map for new comers and as an elaborate NATO system for 
candidate countries to report on their progress and to be evaluated.  
To become a member of NATO, aspirants have to demonstrate a 
functioning democratic, political system and market economy; 
respect for persons belonging to national minorities in accordance 
with OSCE standards; the resolution of all outstanding disputes 
with neighbors and a commitment to the peaceful settlement of 
disputes generally; the ability and willingness to make a military 
contribution to the Alliance and achieve interoperability with other 
members forces; and the proper functioning of civil-military relations 
in line with democratic standards. 
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Participation in the MAP does not guarantee future membership. It 
does, however, enable the interested countries to focus their 
preparations on the goals and priorities set out in the plan and to 
receive specialist help and assessments from NATO. These cover 
all aspects of membership, including political, economic, defense, 
resource, information, security and legal requirements. 
Each participating country chooses the elements of the MAP which 
best suit its needs and establishes its own targets and schedules. 
Participation in the Partnership for Peace, and particularly in the 
PfP Planning and Review Process, is an integral part of the 
process, since it allows candidate countries to develop forces and 
force structures which are better able to operate with the Alliance 
forces. Regular review meetings with Allies are held to monitor 
progress and ensure that advice and feedback is provided. 
Implementation of the MAP is kept under constant review by the 
North Atlantic Council.31  
The years in between the two waves proved to the military staff that the 
first wave of NATO enlargement caught the invitees unprepared. Efforts to 
sustain the new entries were time- and money-consuming. The Membership 
Action Plan set a multitude of objectives for the second wave to accomplish, from 
which the countries could choose the ones most suitable and feasible for their 
individual needs. The MAP process was conducted for five cycles, each of them 
accompanied by periodical analysis and assessment with NATO officials. In 
using these instruments, NATO demanded a great deal from its potential new 
members, much more than it had demanding of states invited to join in the past. 
The requirements covered political and legal aspects, including representation; 
administrative and judicial independence; minority and civil rights; and a 
strengthening of media independence: in short, the building of a functioning 
democracy. The requirements also stipulated the exercise of civilian control over 
the military, transparent military budget, the reduction of the armed forces, which 
must have the ability “to take on the obligations of membership.” Consequently, 
the invitations were formulated, more or less, according to the candidates’ 
capacity to achieve these criteria. 
 
31 NATO Handbook – Membership Action Plan  
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According to the defined and rigorous criteria, we can distinguish, as a 
general rule, at least two groups of analysts: one to support the enlargement 
process and consider it a good decision, the other to deny the importance of the 
enlargement process. 
The latter group concluded that the second enlargement undermined the 
value of NATO membership, due to the number of states added and the lack of 
quality control in adding them. It has served to decrease both NATO’s military 
and its political significance. Based on the experience of the first enlargement the 
analysts affirmed that we couldn’t expect too much from the second enlargement, 
due to the inadequacy of the three Central European members in fulfilling the 
minimal military requirements (MMRs). These MMRs were overlooked in the end, 
because the invitations were made under great political pressure to meet the 
March 12, 1999, accession deadline, which forced the Alliance to make 
concessions. Moreover, they continued despite their belief that the MAP partners’ 
institutional capacities were substantially weaker than those of Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic, whose performance had been less than ideal. NATO 
elder members recognize that the Membership Action Plan has witnessed the 
evolution of a defense reform process among MAP partners since the first 
enlargement and that it has the potential of preparing countries for NATO 
membership far more effectively than before. 
Let us follow their thinking. If we take all the pertinent military-related 
criticism, they are right. However, it is not clear on what this rigidity is based, for 
the organization’s history has a few examples of previous enlargements, older 
and more recent ones, which did not follow the principles, ad literam, but were 
dictated by specific interests corroborated with geo-strategic reasons. Examples 
are Greece under the regime of Colonels, Turkey with its three military coups, 
and Portugal under a dictatorship regime. If the second wave added no value to 
the Alliance in terms of military contributions, how can anybody see Iceland as a 
contributor to NATO? Iceland has no armed forces and is protected by the U.S. 
military. It is true that the seven new members are not militarily comparable to the 
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leading countries, but their participation in operations such as the Implementation 
Force in BiH, the Stabilization Force in BiH, and the International Security 
Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF), Romania and Bulgaria are proving 
otherwise. 
A comparative analysis of new and old member countries and subsequent 
NATO contributors is not only in order, but also relevant. In terms of population, 
we find the following structure.32 The largest member is the United States (285 
million), followed by a group of seven large (40-80 million) members - Germany, 
Turkey, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Poland. There are also 
medium-sized (20 to 30 million) members: Canada, the Netherlands and 
Romania, the rest are small-sized members (up to 10 million) - Denmark, 
Norway, Iceland, Luxembourg, Estonia, Latvia, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Bulgaria.33
Romania and Bulgaria are the two largest new members that have 
provided substantial military support both during Kosovo and in the Global War 
on Terrorism. The remaining five members are very small, with limited capacities. 
Although relatively wealthy, Slovenia (2 million) has consistently devoted little 
interest, energy, or resources to defense. It also lacks popular support for NATO. 
Based on the lessons of the 1999 enlargement, which demonstrated that once a 
country join NATO all leverage is lost, there is little reason to believe that such 
perceptions have changed for Slovenia. The three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania, which are also very small (with respective populations of 1.5, 2.55, 
and 3.6 million) have real defense interests arising from their proximity to Russia. 
In addition, Latvia and Estonia have considerable Russian-speaking ethnic 
minorities, many of whom do not have Latvian or Estonian citizenship. In regard 
to their political systems, they have experienced some instability over the past 
decade. Added together, their population just reaches 15 million. 
 
32 Table complete at the end of the chapter. 
33 CIA, “The World Factbook,” available at:  
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/html  
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The list of all the little insufficiencies could continue, but let us not forget 
that other Allies are doing less than the new members. In some respects, 
maintaining a certain and permanent level of the requirements is an incentive for 
the new entries to improve themselves, on the condition of their fairness 
applicability of the same set of criteria. Applying different standards would 
endanger the cohesion of the Alliance. 
C. NEW MEMBER’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO TRANSATLANTIC 
RELATIONS 
Countries that join the Alliance not only bring their own specific difficulties 
into the club, but also contribute to a new and improved NATO. The current 
NATO area encompasses countries beyond the Cold War geography (map at the 
end of the chapter). As a member or a partner, every country contributes to 
strengthening security and promoting the same set of values. In spite of the 
slightly different criteria applied to different countries at different periods of time, 
NATO has not relinquished its basic requirements. They remain the common 
denominator of NATO membership through the commonalty of ideas and values. 
The idea of a weak NATO after the second round of enlargement is, in this 
context, totally groundless. Every state is a provider, and contributing to the 
common budget, participating in NATO missions, and covering some of the 
niches in NATO’s capabilities. These are the active methods of strengthening the 
transatlantic relationship. 
The Iraq war of 2003 was an important moment in transatlantic relations. 
United States has encountered strong opposition on the other side of the Atlantic 
from France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. The animosities and harsh 
conversations centered around the decision to invade Iraq created confusion and 
inconsistency and gave the new members a bad example of how founding 
members behave in time of crisis. The decisive actions taken by the new allies in 
regard to the Iraq issue may be analyzed from different perspectives. It 
established a pattern of behavior for the countries that formed the coalition, on 
which United States can rely and, despite all odds, it maintained open the lines of 
transatlantic communication. 
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Politically, NATO accession represented for both waves a long-term 
commitment for democratic changes. Even if some critics claim that NATO is not 
a vehicle of democracy, its input to the process can not be denied. For instance, 
the September 2002 elections in Slovakia became a source of concern for NATO 
officials, when, in the first round, the nationalist Vladimir Meciar seemed to be the 
public favorite. His anti-Western views could have hampered the accession 
process. The public became aware of the negative impact brought by the 
nationalist candidate and, in the second round, their vote reflected a pragmatic 
and democratic view, removing Vladimir Meciar from their preferences. 
Strategically, enlargements increased security from the Baltic to the Black 
Sea and visibly reduced tensions with Russia. In view of its new roles and 
missions NATO’s geographic span creates areas of strategic importance for the 
Alliance. Romania and Bulgaria are Black Sea littoral countries and both have 
significant ports and facilities on their coasts. They have already been used as 
refueling and departure points for missions of the U.S. Air Force in Afghanistan. 
For an extensive military operation against Iraq, such facilities will be valuable 
and are likely to be used for transport, re-supply and reconnaissance, as well as 
far rear area facilities. The ability to use these facilities takes on added 
importance, given the hesitation and even reluctance of some states i.e., Turkey 
bordering Iraq to allow their territory to be used in the event of war. 
In terms of costs benefits, every member has to pay, using a comparable 
ration from their budget, and contribute to the NATO civilian and military budget 
and to NATO’s security and investment program (NSIP). Additionally, every 
member has to pay the cost of their personnel posted in Alliance and of their 
forces that participate in NATO-led operations as well as any additional funds 
that result from their involvement in different NATO projects. The financial costs 
require the states to be more responsible and more vigilant regarding their 
defense expenditures. If the PfP program is covered by NATO, membership is 
hardly a free ride. For instance, estimates from U.S. government sources of the 
costs to aspiring members of reforming and reequipping their armed forces (i.e., 
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for Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic) were running between $800 million to 
$1 billion annually, prior to their accession. After their accession considerable 
defense expenditure became national responsibility in order to meet NATO’s 
minimum requirements. In case of Romania, the government has allotted around 
one billion dollars to defense expenditures since 2001, and there is a politically 
strong commitment that this figure be kept in the near future. Also, these costs 
have to be paid from Romania’s own defense budget and do not require any 
other significant costs to NATO. 
To countries that still have to deal with the communist economic legacy, 
such costs may endanger further economic development. As some of the officials 
from the former communist bloc admitted unofficially, the cost of NATO 
membership was greater than they expected. To these financial burdens extra 
pressure was added by competition between the American and the European 
defense industries. New allies faced a delicate situation when they had to choose 
weapons systems that do answer to country’s military requirements. Often, a 
purchase of weapon systems is chosen for political purposes not military needs. 
An example of this was Hungary, whose purchase of fighter aircraft caused a 
crisis over civilian versus military requirements.  
New members have to have very good relations with both NATO and the 
Unites States. For example, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia participated in 
NATO-led multinational forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. All new members have 
also contributed to the U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, either equipment 
or units of their own, or by allowing U.S. use of their bases. These contributions 
to NATO and to development of the transatlantic link show commitment and 
reliability to fulfill the Alliance objectives.  
The concept of “niche capabilities” floated before the Prague Summit 
could be one of Alliance’ keys to success in continuing its transformation to deal 
with the new challenges of the twenty first century. It is notable the Czech 
Republic achievement in fulfilling this concept by developing a contingent in one 
significant area – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear – where NATO 
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was deficient. From developing specific military capabilities both NATO and the 
country benefit. NATO avoids unnecessary duplication of capabilities, therefore it 
reduces the costs and the country develops specific means which can be used 
when required, by either NATO or the country itself. Niche capabilities concept is 
particular suitable to small states such as Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia which do not have large military forces and capabilities. This makes them 
perfect candidates for developing specialized capabilities, whereas countries that 
inherited conventional forces such as Romania and Bulgaria are more suitable to 
maintain adequate defense territorial forces, while developing specialized units in 
specific areas.  
D. IRAQ, A TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CHALLENGE TO THE 
TRANSATLANTIC LINK 
The relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic began to show its 
ugly face when the United States began in 2002 to approach the Europeans 
seeking support for the U.S. potential military operations in Iraq. The stubborn 
refusal of Paris and Berlin to reach an agreement with the United States over 
Iraq issue and the inflexible position adopted by Washington brought the level of 
the relationships close to the freezing point. The French and Germans 
considered that were not sufficient evidence to support the invasion, whereas the 
Americans were not able to yield to French and Germany economic interests in 
the region. 
September 11 and NATO enlargements had found the allies together and 
committed to dealing with the new challenges of the twenty-first century. The Iraq 
issue constituted a point of division, causing transatlantic relations to be a major 
theme of commentary and analysis and the year of 2003 to be considered and 
remembered as an “annus horribilis”, par excellence, for international relations as 
a whole, but particularly for transatlantic relations34. “Never the United States 
were  so  contested  on  the  international   scene,  never  were  European  public  
 
34 Nicole Gnesotto, “Chaillot Paper,” no 68, March 2004 
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opinions so directly expressed. The ad-hoc coalitions perhaps produced some 
military effects, but they did not create political dynamism or international 
legitimacy.”35
Of course, we have to recognize that the transatlantic relationship as any 
"relation" does have problems, but if we put it in a historical and political context 
and avoid exaggeration, we see the "Iraq momentum" not as a profound crisis, 
but as just the latest in a cyclical pattern of ups and downs that has characterized 
transatlantic relations for fifty years.  
Americans, Canadians, and Europeans are part of an alliance of 
democracies that share common values and, broadly, common objectives and 
interests. By definition, in an alliance of democracies debates and disputes are 
beneficial to its health, as long as do not degenerate into bitter and prolonged 
ones. Historical events reveal in the clearest manner that disagreements cause 
strains that can damage the very existence of the Western Alliance. In the 1956 
Suez Crisis the allies opposed each other. Vietnam, in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, was a war in which the European powers declined to participate. From 
the 1979 Pershing Missile crisis to the situation in Kosovo, we find that the allies 
have had their share of unfriendly disputes that sometimes brought people into 
the streets in protest.  
In the past several years, genuine policy differences between the United 
States and its European allies have emerged over numerous issues besides Iraq: 
whether Cuba, Libya, and Iran should be engaged or isolated; the 
Israeli/Palestinian crisis; the role international institutions should play in the 
global arena; when is legitimate to make use of force; the Kyoto Accord; the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC); the military debate within 
NATO regarding burden-sharing and power-sharing; American unilateralism, etc. 
Was the Iraq invasion surfacing a much deeper and longer-lasting divide? Was 
the Old and New divide in fact a matter of perception, the Americans using 
 
35 Nicole Gnesotto, “Chaillot Paper,” March 2004, 33, translation from French  
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military to defend their security whereas the Europeans were using the shabby 
coat of diplomacy as an alternative to military might?  
The main issue was the position that was taken by the European countries 
toward the American intervention in Iraq, which brought countries either wholly in 
favor of or very much against it. The effort of U.S. diplomacy to convince allies 
about the necessity for a military intervention in Iraq and to confer it the 
necessary legitimacy through a resolution of the UN Security Council failed 
because of the fierce opposition of France, supported by Germany and Russia. 
The result was that the United States started and won the war in Iraq without 
these two important allies, but supported by newly European allies. 
A short analysis of this event introduces us to the historical context and 
creates the framework needed to describe the contribution of new NATO 
members to the transatlantic link. Rarely has an event offered such concentrated 
insights. The central concepts of "interests" and "power," more valuable than 
ever, influenced and determined fundamentally the behavior of international 
actors, whether states or institutions. 
For instance, the United States strength, as compared to military 
weakness of any European country, was revealed by its own behavior in 
attracting, in a non traditional manner under its “umbrella", new allies for support 
and legitimacy. France and Germany’s determination in pursuing an institutional 
approach against Iraq, through the Security Council, was an attempt to enforce 
diplomatic mechanisms in the absence of military ones. It also explains why 
relations are increasingly unraveling between American that, naturally, wants to 
preserve its freedom of action as much as possible and Europeans that, given 
their strategic weakness, want to constrain American power in multilateral 
institutions as much as possible. 
However, the United States manifested pure political realism, showing that 
the power concept is very valid in twenty-first century, and suggested that it 
would rather pursue unilateral actions than with its traditional allies, that it would 
rather not even consult its allies, and partially acted in this way. This glimpse of 
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U.S. foreign policy was given by two officials on different occasions: Donald 
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, shortly after the 9/11 attacks stated that “the 
mission will determine the coalition”, “the coalition must not determine the 
mission”36 and Paul Wolfowitz, deputy Secretary of Defense, stated, in the 2001 
meeting of defense ministers in Brussels, that the United States is looking for 
“different coalitions in different parts of the world”37 and do not intend to rely only 
on NATO capabilities. 
This dispute between France and the United States is not something new. 
I recalls the anti-American attitude of France during the time of General de 
Gaulle, and the ambitions of France (supported by Germany) in the creation of 
the European Security and Defense Identity. Both countries acknowledged that it 
was the German-French relationship that acted as the locomotive of the 
European project over the past forty years and as an engine of unified Europe. 
However, I the Iraq crisis was a bad time for France to express and promote its 
ambitions, because the result showed us a dominant United States in the 
international system, especially in the military sphere, and that it still has a strong 
influence on European decisions. The Iraq issue was not just an opportunity for 
the United States to claim and prove its supremacy, it also created a high level of 
frustration and resentment that may bounce back on the United States. Using a 
"coalition of willing" as a proof of legitimacy and “bilateral relations" as a method 
or course of action, President George W. Bush (with decisive assistance from 
Prime Minister Tony Blair) succeeded in bringing together European heads of 
state and government who joined the coalition. In this way, Europe has learned a 
valuable lesson: it does not have the ability to have a “single voice” or maintain a 
“single voice” in critical matters, due to strong, individual interests. 
In an attempt to fight back, Old Europe (Luxembourg, Belgium, France, 
and Germany) initiated a meeting at Tervuren in April 2003, to establish an EU 
military headquarters and bring about other improvements in the European 
 
36 Jeremy Bransten, “2002 in review: Seven new members end false balance of fear, 
available at: http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/12122002184027.asp
37 Philip Gordon, “NATO after 11 September,” Survival, 43, no 4.  
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security and defense field. It was another bad time for the transatlantic link and 
its founders. The initiative received aggressive reactions from the United States, 
even though the founders tried to assure that the initiative and NATO were not in 
competition. On the contrary, they claimed they were complementary, and did not 
affect Euro-Atlantic relations. It was an attempt to create a European 
unilateralism that has been counteracted by the United States. Unfortunately, 
some European countries, that had close ties with the United States and wanted 
to preserve NATO as the pre-eminent security organization on the continent, 
were not convinced by the vision of Europe as a counter-balance force to the 
United States, which could have shaken the foundations of transatlantic relations. 
Therefore, the four initiators were singled out in their endeavor. 
E. NEW MEMBERS AND THE IRAQI CRISIS 
Traditional allies continued to oppose U.S. policy. The main three 
opposing countries - Germany, France, and Turkey - refused to give the 
necessary military assistance. However, the attitude of new NATO members, in 
this very difficult moment for transatlantic relations, contributed substantially to 
maintaining the transatlantic link. If these nations had not supported the United 
States, maybe today we would be having discussions about a very serious crisis. 
In this context, the United States was justified in turning its attention and 
diplomatic efforts to the new entries in the Alliance and, especially, to those 
countries that were not yet accepted, such as Romania and Bulgaria. The 
political divergences were first given voice by the Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld, who, in a Munich press conference, indicated that the United States 
intended to move east in searching for support. The support came promptly. A 
few days after Rumsfeld’s press conference, eight European leaders (Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Denmark and the UK) 
signed an open letter called “United We Stand.” 
The letter highlighted the common values that both sides of the Atlantic 
share and the impact of the 9/11 attacks against the United States, which is 
another reason for the Allies to stick tighter against the common threat. 
 46
                                                
Moreover, this relationship has “stood the test of time,” and both sides must 
prevent the transformation of NATO, and transatlantic relationships at large, into 
a casualty over the Iraq issue. The eight-country letter became the ten after its 
endorsement by two other countries, Romania and Bulgaria, which were not 
members at the time. 
After that bold, unequivocal, and firm pledge by the two southeast 
European countries, President Chirac’s response was blunt and totally 
undiplomatic: “Donc je crois qu'ils ont manqué une bonne occasion de se 
taire."38. “They missed a good opportunity to keep their mouth shut”. It was for 
first time in half a century that two such countries had the opportunity to speak 
freely. For more then fifty years the Soviets had controlled their “communication” 
to the outside world. Now, President Chirac, a democratic leader had slipped into 
the red zone of dictatorship that they had experienced for so long, assuming the 
role of censor over the politics of independent countries. His reaction was blamed 
by the international community as not only undiplomatic and inappropriate, but 
also as undemocratic. An answer came promptly from the former prime minister 
of Estonia, who became the unofficial spokesman for the entire aspirant bloc and 
encompassed almost everything that an east Europe wanted to say to Mr. 
Chirac.  
So, even before Mr. Chirac's impromptu lecture, the Franco-
German decision to exclude the 10 future EU members from 
Monday's dinner party in Brussels went down like a rock in my 
country. Presumably Paris and Berlin decided to snub the Eastern 
Europeans because they're too "pro-American." Is this how the 
future EU will function? 
For similar reasons, the recent crisis at NATO raised troubling 
questions, too. If a member-state feels threatened, like Turkey 
does, and asks NATO to take necessary countermeasures, how 
can it be rejected (until a quiet deal, behind France's back, pulls the 
alliance from the brink)? Is this the great defense institution we all 
dreamt of joining? From the point of view of the new Europeans, 
U.S.-European tensions aren't to blame. The fault lies within old 
 
38 “Le Monde,” 18 February 2003. 
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Europe. Some Europeans, perhaps Mr. Chirac among them, see an 
American conspiracy in East European support for the U.S.; others 
think the new Europeans support Washington because only the 
U.S. can guarantee their security. Still others see a logical reaction 
to Franco-German attempts to keep a bigger EU under their 
control. It's more complicated than that. These countries, including 
my own, bring a different historical perspective to the EU and 
NATO. They experienced not only a short Nazi occupation, but a 
much longer Communist one. Words such as "freedom" or 
"democracy" have real meaning in my part of the world. To survive 
and overthrow dictatorship, people here had to stand by values -- 
even if sometimes that meant hiding them deeply inside yourself. 
As a result, the Central and Eastern Europe approach to foreign 
policy is today based more on values than that of Western Europe. 
They are more receptive to "moral arguments," on Iraq and a host 
of other issues and less understanding of "European Realpolitik." 
The new Europeans remember that when President Ronald 
Reagan issued a moral indictment of the Soviet Union by calling it 
what it was -- an "evil empire" -- he was heavily criticized in 
Western Europe. To them, the evil was self-evident; they couldn't 
understand why West Europeans didn't grasp this simple truth. Mr. 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher are still popular in Eastern Europe 
and even in Russia: their decisiveness boosted the captive nations 
in their struggle and ultimately brought down the Soviet Union. 
People in Eastern Europe know appeasement does not work. They 
know dictatorships must be dealt with head on. But the new Europe 
will never turn against old Europe. To the contrary, new Europe 
wants to reinvigorate all of Europe through enlargement. This is not 
only in the interest of the new member-states. The "Letter of Eight" 
was signed by "old" member-states who were frustrated with 
German and French attempts to claim EU leadership all for 
themselves. And the Western world needs a united Europe; the 
U.S. can benefit from it too. The coming enlargement of the EU will 
force large-scale reforms upon Europe, whether it wants it or not. 
Central and Eastern European countries have some of the highest 
growth rates in Europe. Taxes in future member states are lower, 
economies more open, labor markets more reasonably regulated, 
social security networks less expensive. All of which means they 
should make a united Europe more competitive. The dramatic 
stand-off over Iraq is another reminder that it is time for Europe to 
change. It must become more dynamic, decisive, competitive, open 
and future-orientated. European nations can retain their unique 
identities, while remaining open to each other. This is the real 
European identity -- not some false oneness. But it will require 
genuine cooperation and not a division of Europe into first- and 
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second-class members. It will require a Europe where countries 
aren't told to stay quiet but are free to speak their minds. 
Unfortunately, some EU members have yet to embrace this 
message, as Monday's summit and Mr. Chirac's great outburst 
showed. We all need to be proud of Europe but first we must make 
all Europe new.39
Romania and Bulgaria’s pledge and support of the United States had 
multiple implications. Aspirant states were not only willing to become members of 
the NATO club, but also demonstrated both their intention to participate in the 
decision process and that their troops would be involved, actively in international 
conflicts. Their troop’s commitment to remote theaters is part of the countries’ 
efforts to captatio benevolentiae of the influential states even if they attracted a 
lot of criticism for their decisions. Their involvement in Iraq with the United States 
was not a risk-free action. Their security is at stake, since they could become 
targets for terrorist reactions. 
F. THE UNITED STATES OR EUROPE 
In spite of momentary disagreements among the allies and the 
awkwardness of their position, the new members still believe in the validity of the 
fundamental principles that support the transatlantic relationships. Its strength 
comes from fifty years of historical evolution which proves that any obstacle can 
be an opportunity if is assessed correctly, and could reinforce the old established 
link.  
The end of the Cold war changed the dynamics and development of the 
European Union, too. Just as NATO has been enlarging to embrace the Central 
and Eastern European countries, so is the EU. This enlargement is good for 
Europe, even if the construction of the EU is a laborious and touchy business. 
Central and Southeastern European countries’ primary foreign policy goal was 
integration into the western European community of democracies, and NATO 
and the EU were their entry tickets. The mutual dependence created by 
 
39 Open letter by Mart Laar, former Prime-minister of Estonia published in The Wall Street 
Journal, 19,February 2003 under the title “New Europe Won't 'Keep Quiet' Until All Europe Is 
New.” 
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transatlantic realities would make it that much more difficult for the United States 
and Europe to go their own separate ways. 
Since the end of World War II, Europe has not had the force to articulate a 
common defense policy. Even the European Security Defense Policy and its 
ambitious Helsinki Goal are not ready to protect EU member states. This 
European reality is based on Europe’s inability to agree on significant foreign 
policy issues and its unwillingness to relinquish some of their sovereignty. 
Therefore, in matters of security, countries should not seek help at the EU, but at 
NATO, which has the planning capacity, the means, and the experience 
necessary.  Europe can not ensure by its own means its peace and security 
without U.S. involvement. Indeed, I am skeptical whether the European states 
have a chance to create an autonomous capacity capable of dealing efficiently 
with the new twenty-first century threats in the next 10-15 years without the 
United States. Previous situations have plentifully demonstrated this assertion. 
The Yugoslav conflicts have highlighted Europe’s inability to deal with problems 
in its own backyard, and the burden-sharing of waging war against the Taliban 
only serves to emphasize Europe’s inability to project true military power. 
Besides, most European governments’ attitudes show that there is no political 
willingness in their countries to increase defense budgets, which are kept below 
the NATO benchmark of 2 percent of GDP (German defense spending was 1.5 
percent in 2003, Belgium 1.3, Denmark 1.6, Netherlands 1.6, and Spain 1.2). 
Comparatively, Europe presently spends only two-thirds of what the United 
States does on defense, and its deployable fighting strength is one quarter of 
America’s. In these circumstances, without financial commitment, we can not 
expect much progress in reducing the discrepancy in capacity between the 
United States and the European countries.   
Today, the EU and NATO are the two institutions responsible for Europe's 
future. The spring 2004 enlargements of both NATO and the EU have advanced 
the allies’ common goal of a Europe “whole, free, and at peace”. Integration into 
NATO and the European Union are complementary processes, not exclusionist. 
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The new NATO members are important U.S. allies and friends, and together 
contribute to the same shared vision of a Europe "whole, free, and at peace." 
NATO membership could be considered as another step toward full integration 
into Europe; in fact, many regional leaders view it as a short-cut or backdoor 
approach to EU membership.  
A framework like NATO is considered the most appropriate step to acquire 
the basic elements of a democracy. For new members the value of the Alliance is 
incommensurable. NATO is as much democratic as any other organization and 
the better modality to prove is one country, one vote policy, which is the ideal 
arrangement for states to have a voice in decision process. NATO is the only 
significant organization in which every country has the same power in debating 
process, in other words, the Luxembourg’ s vote has as same value as that of the 
United States, at least theoretically. We do not find the same situation in the UN 
(the Security Council which makes the final decisions, has only five permanent 
members) or the EU (seats in the European Parliament are distributed in 
accordance with the population of each country). On the other hand, an alliance 
like NATO is important for the United States, because, by and large, an alliance 
is not only a source of restraint, but also a resource for help. Without the active 
involvement of European allies and other partners in the Middle East (a 
predominant U.S. area of interest) the U.S. effort is doomed to failure. Without 
the cooperation of international peacekeepers, nation-building in Iraq would be a 
far more difficult endeavor to sustain. 
The Iraqi crisis also constitutes a very valuable proof that the United 
States could depend on the new NATO members; this could serve as a 
guarantee for the future. 
G. DEVELOPING THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK 
The new members wish to improve the transatlantic link and current 
premises anticipate that much more cooperation can be expected in the future. 
There is general agreement that for success in Iraq, reconstruction and transition 
are crucial; and only a concerted effort can win the war against global terrorism. 
Although the deployment of German or French troops in Iraq at the moment is 
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out of the question, they may assist in other tasks such as creating and training 
Iraqi forces or participation in other theaters. Germany remains committed to 
leading the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan and 
contributes with 1,836 troops. French troops are deployed in Haiti alongside U.S. 
forces. 
 For all that has changed in transatlantic relations over the past decade, 
the core of the relationship remains largely intact. This core consists of a 
commitment to a set of values, peace, democracy, and liberty that is shared by 
Americans and Europeans alike. As strange as it may sound, the Iraq crisis had 
some beneficial aspects. A U.S.-European deterioration of relations may lead to 
a realization on both sides of the Atlantic that a major readjustment is necessary 
in order to renew and update their partnership in ways appropriate to the era we 
now live in.   
 On the one hand, Europe could enhance its capacity for joint action, 
especially in the military field. Real partnership requires real and interoperable 
military capabilities. Europeans also have to demonstrate a willingness to carry 
more of the burden, not just in Europe, but increasingly beyond Europe as well. 
 On the other hand, the United States has to avoid abusing the “coalition 
of the willing” concept, which is detrimental to the Alliance. It has to strengthen 
the organization rather than abandon it or take it for granted. 
 The solution is partnership not competition. There is no more dangerous 
theory in international politics than the “necessity” to balance the power of 
America with other competitive powers.  
 Recently, efforts were made to regain the trust and to repair the harm 
done. As was admitted in a press conference by the U.S. President George W. 
Bush, “We will have differences of opinion, but there is a lot more that we agree 
upon, and that is the bottom line and the basis for this great Alliance.”40 Signs 
that the Iraq divergences were put aside are given by all twenty six allies who are  
 
40 Summit meeting at the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 22 February 2005. 
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contributing to the training of Iraqi security forces under different formulas (direct 
on-site training, outside training, financial contributions, or donations of 
equipment).  
As President Bush said, on the same occasion, “the most successful 
Alliance in world history,” NATO survived the crisis, and perhaps transatlantic 
relations will come out stronger and, hopefully, wiser.   
Fifty years of an Atlantic Alliance countered the irrefutable Soviet threat, 
and managed to shape a common paradigm according to which the Euro-
American alliance was an existential contract linking a common destiny on both 
sides of the ocean. Even in crisis times, any alternative to the Alliance is 
inconceivable, dangerous, and impossible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.   Picture was retrieved from NATO Public Diplomacy 
Division 
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State Population Area (sq km) Defence 
expenditures (in 
millions of US$) 
Defence 
expenditures as 
% of GDP 
Belgium 10,348,276 30,528 3,999 1.3 
Denmark 5,413,392 43,094 3,271.6 1.6 
France 60,424,213 547,030 45,238.1 2.6 
Germany 82,424,609 357,021 35,063 1.5 
Greece 10,647,529 131,940 7,288.9 4.3 
Iceland 293,966 103,300 0 0 
Italy 58,057,477 301,230 28,182.8 1.9 
Luxembourg 462,690 2,586 231.6 0.9 
Netherlands 16,318,199 41,526 8,044.4 1.6 
Norway 4,574,560 324,220 4,033.5 1.9 
Portugal 10,524,145 92,391 3,497.8 2.3 
Spain 40,280,780 504,782 9,906.5 1.2 
Turkey 68,893,000 780,580 12,155 5.3 
UK 60,270,708 244,820 42,836 2.4 
Canada 32,507,874 9,984,670 9,801.7 1.1 
USA 293,027,571 9,631,418 370,700 3.3 
    
Poland 38,626,349 312,685 3,500 1.71 
Hungary 10,032,375 93,030 1,080 1.75 
Czech Rep. 10,246,178 78,866 1,190.2 2.1 
    
Estonia 1,341,664 45,226 155 2 
Latvia 2,306,306 64,589 87 1.2 
Lithuania 3,607,899 65,200 230.8 1.9 
Romania 22,355,551 237,500 985 2.47 
Slovakia 5,423,567 48,845 406 1.89 
Slovenia 2,011,473 20,273 370 1.7 
 
Table 1.   The World Fact Book 2004 
 
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook, accessed between February and March 
2005. 
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IV. ROMANIA - THE CATALYST OF THE SECOND WAVE 
A. WHY WAS NATO THE FIRST CHOICE? 
Soon after the 1989 Romanian Revolution and, concomitantly, the demise 
of the communist system, the main concerns of Romanian authorities were to 
find ways to protect the country from external threats. The instrument that 
ensured this protection, the Warsaw Pact, was no longer able to fulfill its tasks. 
Romanian inability to respond to outside threats was the primary incentive for 
seeking feasible alternatives. Furthermore, Romania’s proximity to the USSR, 
later Russia and Ukraine, never constituted a motive for regional détente; 
Romania’s history is full of unfortunate examples of territorial wrenching by 
different and much more powerful actors. It was, in this respect, imperative for a 
country such as Romania, having such neighbors, to ensure its protection with 
the help of powerful alliances or partners. Their simple presence as partners or 
allies would be a deterrent to any potential voracious or damaging attempt on 
Romania’s integrity. Security was, therefore, the first reason for Romania’s NATO 
accession, as President Iliescu stated in his letter of application: 
To support the continuation and strengthening of the process of 
internal democracy and the implementation of the economic 
reforms in these countries, it is essential to guarantee equal 
security for all states in our geographical area. It is the only way to 
prevent the spillover of conflicts from our vicinity and emergence of 
new risks to security.41  
Most of the Southeastern European countries, after the disruptive collapse 
of communism, had more or less the same security dilemma.  Should they worry 
more about their security or should they enjoy the benefits of being a security 
free-rider? A free-rider policy brings maximum efficiency with zero costs, but 
having  influential  neighbors  it  is  also  a  risky one. Should they concentrate on  
 
41 Translation from Romanian, Letter of Application to NATO membership from the President 
of Romania to the Secretary General of NATO, dated 18 September 1993. 
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economic development and put other aspects at the bottom of their list of 
priorities? Is the destiny of a middle-sized southeastern European country 
predetermined by a series of external prescriptive recipes, which the target 
country does not even have the opportunity to shape? Can Romania really have 
the power to influence its future and not be satisfied only with leftovers or scraps 
from the bigger actors’ dinner table?  
These are the questions that motivated this chapter, which is based on the 
premise that Romania’s influence on its own future must be weighed carefully 
against its location, strategic importance, neighbors, and allies. A positive attitude 
and openness are critical to successfully resolving any differences, as are 
respect for the international laws and treaties and, most important, maintaining 
open lines of communication. 
Romania is situated in southeast Europe in a region that has been 
repeatedly torn apart by insecurity and instability. In this highly security-
challenged environment it is difficult to maintain a consistent foreign policy 
without losing some of the imperative attributes that make the difference between 
being a reliable partner and a swing one. Maintaining the country’s dignity, pride, 
and honor, while preserving its specific characteristics, and still being able to 
influence the decision process requires integrity which, unfortunately, is often not 
an attribute of international relations. Thus, the institutional approach is more 
suitable and beneficial for countries such as Romania. It is the only framework 
that virtually assures equal voting on decisions, whereas the European Union 
process is rather complicated, involving each country’s population and voting 
ratio.  
Lessons learned from historical precedents, especially from relatively 
recent ones (e.g., 1990s’ the regional security environment, Yugoslavian 
disintegration, and political instability in Russia are the most illustrative examples 
of  the  level  of  regional  instability),  were  strong  enough  motives  for  seeking  
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security alternatives. NATO and the European Union were identified as the most 
viable ones, with one specification: NATO presented a stronger portfolio than the 
European Union.  
NATO, initially designed as a military organization, had almost fifty years 
experience in the field. Compared with the European Union it had better military 
capabilities and a better planning capacity. The European Union is still in its 
kindergarten years in regard to collective security.   
Romania understood relatively quickly that the country’s various objectives 
had to be prioritized and its subsequent actions had to be channeled toward a 
primary goal. It also understood that, as the biggest country in the region, it had 
to become a model for its neighbors. The method that Romania decided would 
best accomplish this task was bidirectional. One direction required developing a 
strategic partnership with the United States, the only country willing to assist 
Romania’s endeavors. The other direction required participation in regional 
military operations; this was an opportunity to become a security provider, not a 
free-rider.  
Another benefit of NATO membership was represented by its worldwide 
significance. Many political analysts evaluated NATO membership as the first 
step toward further European Union integration. In fact, fulfilling NATO’s five 
capital accession criteria was similar to fulfilling the EU criteria that were 
formulated at the1993 Copenhagen summit.42   
By the time the NATO Study on Enlargement came out in 1995, Romania 
was beginning to focus on the United States and Germany as the engines of 
Alliance’s expansion, whereas the United Kingdom and other northern countries 
remained hesitant to accept any southeast European entrance. In addition to the 
U.S. interest in expanding the Alliance toward east, closer to its former enemy, 
 
42 In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council, the Union set out the basic requirements 
that aspirant countries must meet: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces; the ability 
to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic 
and monetary union; information retrieved from the EU website; http://europa.eu.int/  
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Germany had its own interest in the process. It was fairly obvious that after 
Germans reunification, most of its efforts would be directed toward internal 
issues that required a peaceful neighborhood. Germany’s interest in enlargement 
also had an ulterior motivation. It viewed enlargement as an attempt to 
reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship after the disputes between the United 
States and the United Kingdom on the one side and France and Germany on the 
other over the European Security Defense Identity initiative and the contribution 
of the latter countries to it.43 One response to these internal disputes was NATO 
expansion, which erased the uncertainties about its relevance in the post-Cold 
War environment.    
B. MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTION TO THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK 
 Central and Southeast European political-military cooperation initiatives 
were set off to compensate for the security vacuum left after the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact.  
Romania made its debut in the political-military cooperation process in 
1996, followed by a successive series of initiatives with regional and international 
vocation. Romanian participation in the stages preceding NATO membership 
should not be seen as a substitute for NATO, but as preparation and training for 
membership. In fact, NATO, as well as the EU, encourages regional cooperation 
as a modality of exercising the negotiations abilities and better understanding of 
participants, all of these having the role of confidence-building and, 
consequently, strengthening the security.  
In the recent period, certain “tiredness” was noted in these regional 
initiatives, probably due to international commitments which asked for high levels 
of involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, a quasi-stabilization of the situation in the 
Balkans, along with the extension of the “Euro-Atlantic” area. 
Romania had reached maturity in regional cooperation in a relatively short 
time due to the professionalism demonstrated by its troops in all circumstances. 
 
43 Roy Rempel, “German Security Policy in the New European Order,” in “Disconcerted 
Europe: the search for a new security architecture,” 1994. 
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It was acknowledged as such on various occasions when it had the opportunity 
to preside, by rotation, over some of the initiatives, such as: in 2000, the Central 
European Nations Cooperation for Peace44 (CENCOOP) Presidency, in 2001 the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Presidency, and 
between 2001 and 2003 South East Defense Ministerial (SEDM) Presidency.  
Within these initiatives, member countries developed inter-national 
projects aimed at interoperability and readiness. Within SEDM, projects include 
the Multinational Peace Task Force of South East Europe (MPFSEE), whose 
purpose is to conduct peace support operations, except peace enforcement, led 
by NATO or the EU under a UN or OSCE mandate.45 Under the same initiative, 
a simulation network was developed for military exercises assisted by computer; 
a working group was also established, Counterproliferation, Border Security, and 
Counterterrorism (CBSC) to address the problems related to current threats. 
A specific participation for the countries from the Black Sea basin is the 
Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR),46 whose purposes are search and rescue 
and humanitarian assistance. Another initiative targeting confidence-building and 
reciprocal knowledge is the Romanian-Hungarian Peace Support Battalion, 
which was established under direct supervision of France and Germany. They 
also provided valuable experience and gave an example of the modality of 
cooperation.  
Under NATO’s vigilant eye, especially the United States and Germany, 
these regional cooperative initiatives had an important role in developing 
transatlantic relations.  States are more conscious of problems in their backyard 
and the real potential to solve them. Cooperating and maintaining open lines of 
communication are the keys to a peaceful solution to all the problems. Assuring a 
comfortable level of security and stability in the region is a palpable contribution 
 
44 Participant countries are: Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and 
Switzerland.  
45 Participant countries are: Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM, Greece, Italy, Romania, and Turkey. 
Croatia, Slovenia and the United States have an observer status. 
46 Participant countries are: Bulgaria, Russia, Georgia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
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to the real purpose of the Alliance. The win-win situation applies to all levels: the 
individual participants, the region, the Alliance, all are benefiting from these 
initiatives. The “tiredness” mentioned earlier may signal not a lack of interest, but 
an achievement of their initial purposes. 
C. SHARING THE BURDEN                       
Romania’s incontestable leadership of the second wave was further 
proved by its consistent demonstration of its commitment. Even before the NATO 
invitation, Romania understood that its future decisions would be based on the 
current actions. In the Yugoslav crisis, Romania acted thinking of its future role, 
in spite of unpopularity of its decisions. Permitting NATO aircraft to have access 
to Romanian air space during the bombing campaign, even though the 
population was against it, positioned Romania according to NATO values and 
principles. U.S. troops were also permitted to transit Romanian territory, which 
gave the strategists the opportunity to consider Romania as a less costly route, in 
similar cases in the future. 
Whether to NATO or to the United States, the Romanian commitment was 
not less relevant. Romanian troops were sent to Afghanistan as part of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was endorsed by UN 
Security Council Resolutions 1386/2001, 1413/2002, and 1444/2002, whose 
tasks were to implement the 2001 Bonn Agreement under the forceful Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. At Bonn, NATO members and partners (as Romania was 
at the time) reached a consensus in designing the map of the future Afghanistan. 
Looking at it, the resemblance to the Dayton Peace Agreements is striking. The 
success of the Implementation Force and followed by the Stabilization Force, 
was applied on a much difficult case, Afghanistan. Besides the United States, 
other members were consistently involved in ISAF operations, including the UK, 
Germany, and Turkey. The command of the mission was assured under the 
principle of rotation among the most generous providers; the mission, 
nevertheless, involved 36 countries (members and non-members) with a total 
troop contribution of 8,000, altogether with the Enduring Freedom operation. 
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  In addition to the ISAF mission, Romania provided troops to Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the US-led combat mission, which has contributions from 55 
countries. According to the Romanian Minister of National Defense, Romania has 
500 troops in Afghanistan in both ISAF and Enduring Freedom.47 Even though 
there is still a continuous military presence in Afghan territory, the situation 
permitted the entry of post-conflict elements for reconstruction and state 
rebuilding, signaling slight but steady improvements in establishing Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams, training the Afghan National Army, and establishing a 
Constitution. Elections were one of the main steps made toward normalization 
and self-reliance.  
Romanian troops’ participation in the Afghan theater is as follows: one 
military police platoon; one transport aircraft C-130 (crew and technical team), 
and three Liaison Officers: two officers in Norfolk/Virginia and one in Kabul. 
Romanian participation in operation Enduring Freedom includes one infantry 
battalion to Kandahar; one group of liaison officers; one CIMIC group, and one 
unit for Afghan National Army training. According to the latest evaluation, the 
equipment of the deployed battalion is fully compatible with NATO's equipment 
for this mission with the possibility of self-sustainability for 30 days. All the 
personnel is professional and trained for the mission and the troop's moral is very 
good. Romania also participates in a much contested operation Iraqi Freedom, 
along with 48 other countries; the operation which represented the discord apple 
inside the Alliance. Romanian participation in operation Iraqi Freedom includes 
one infantry battalion; one liaison group, one engineering unit; one special unit, 
and one military police company.   
This extensive participation in far-away operations does not mean that the 
regional military involvement is forgotten. After SFOR concluded its mission in 
December 2004, a smaller contingent remained on site along with the European 
mission, ALTHEA. In Kosovo, Romania’s contribution remains unchanged: the 
 
47 “Coalition Bulletin,” no 18, 20 available at: www.centcom.mil/operations/Coalition/joint.htm, 
accessed on 8 March 2005.  
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KFOR mission includes two infantry companies; one traffic platoon, and one 
liaison group. A sizable strategic reserve of 400 troops is ready anytime to 
intervene if necessary.48
From the Romanian perspective, the decision to participate in the US-led 
operations represented a cross road moment: Romania had to choose between 
NATO and the EU. The decision was not easy, even though NATO membership 
in 2003 was just a formality. A country such as Romania, with a painful history 
that in difficult times comes back to haunt us, cannot afford to alienate either 
NATO or the EU, due to its legacy, location, neighbors, and perception of threats. 
Consequently, Romanian success depended on both, each of them contributing 
in different areas, security and the economy. 
History, and especially recent history, showed Romania that there are no 
strict recipes, no rigid formulas that apply. The field of international relations is 
too fluid and exchangeable to offer a predictable framework. Even a state 
response in similar situations could not be the same, a factor that makes a 
country’s specific behavior irrelevant and, certainly, less predictable if the 
incentives or benefits are below a certain level. Experiences of this type show 
that states that fit the above profile have no alternative but to jump on the train 
that has the bigger, faster, wealthier, and most influential locomotive, despite the 
potential criticism that this action may attract.  
The tale of Buridan’s donkey provides a more profane description of the 
situation faced by Romania. In the story a donkey came from working and was 
thirsty and hungry. His master let him loose in the middle of the road. On one 
side of the road was a stack of hay; on the other side was a bucket of water. The 
donkey stood in the middle looking at both sides, unable to make a decision. 
Consequently, the donkey died. The original medieval version told of a donkey 
facing two equal-sized stacks of hay. The end was the same. The moral of this 
old story is that, when you face a life-threatening choice, you must to make a 
 
48 Figures mentioned in this paragraph are retrieved from the Ministry of National Defense. 
Text available at: www.mapn.ro/index.ro; accessed on 9 March 2005.  
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decision; otherwise, you will end up dead in the middle of the road. A “middle” 
type of policy may prevent you from achieving your purpose. 
At the moment of U.S. intervention in Iraq (March 2003), Romania had a 
NATO “invitee country” status. What better opportunity to prove the kind of ally 
that Romania could be? Its choice should have not evoked such a strong 
reaction from Paris, which threatened both Romania and Bulgaria for siding with 
the United States. It was the rational, pragmatic choice of an independent state 
that wanted both to show its capabilities and to reverse any residual feeling 
against it as a former communist state that might impede the development of 
U.S. – Romanian relations. 
Fifty years of tradition between both sides of the Atlantic managed to 
encompass a strong nucleus of European and American values despite critical 
voices such as Robert Kagan’s, who argues that our common values are growing 
apart, hence the difficulties to “speak the same language.”49 Our general values 
include democracy, commitment to the importance of the individual, respect for 
basic human rights and the rule of law, and tolerance and appreciation of 
diversity. Both sides of the Atlantic also share a strong belief in the role of free 
trade and competitive markets in improving the daily lives of our citizens. For new 
members, to consider a strategic order without reference to America is 
something similar to conceiving of the organization of their trade without 
reference to the EU. The Euro-Atlantic link, in fact, will survive and prevail, 
because Europe needs the United States and the United States needs Europe.  
 The NATO summit on 22 February 2005 in Brussels represented a 
perfect opportunity for American and European leaders to work toward 
normalization of their relations. In fact, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld paved the road for President Bush’s visit. 
The Americans’ visits to Europe, at the highest levels, indicate clearly that the 
U.S. agenda regarding Europe is making efforts to return to its former routine. 
 
 
49 Robert Kagan, “Power and weakness,” Policy Review no 113, June 2002. 
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D. POLICY OF POSITIVE INCENTIVES 
 The military theatres opened after the 9/11 attacks are still conducting 
operations. Afghanistan and Iraq, though not as much as at the beginning, still 
represent the main military focus. However, their evolutions are encouraging for 
transition to civilian reconstruction phase, which implies a lesser military 
presence on the ground.  
 The efforts made by the allies (willingly) alongside U.S. troops were 
significant for their bilateral relations and beneficial for the cohesion of the 
Alliance. Recognition of the burdens some of the allies had to bear apparently 
took the form of rewards. As part of a theory of influence, positive incentives are 
prone to work in the case of democracies with mutual interests, rather than 
applying threats. Economic benefits, military advantages, and diplomatic 
recompense are all part of the strategy to reward allies who conduct themselves 
in the desired way.  
 Romania, through its consistent actions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq, managed to alleviate some of the hurtful perceptions of it held by Western 
Europeans and the United States. Even if the political decision is critical to further 
developments, its relevance stops here. Meaningful actions must be taken to 
reinforce the political pledges that eventually will enhance the credibility of the 
state at the international level and change perceptions. 
 Some might consider a positive-incentives approach insulting, but it 
results in a win-win relationship, in realistic terms. What are the facts that support 
the above framework? For Romania, the milestones were Kosovo, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq. The U.S. decision to open military hostilities against Iraq proved to be 
counterproductive for NATO members’ relations. This opened the possibility for 
Romania to go along with the coalition, despite threats inferred by President 
Chirac.  
 The American mass-media recently brought to the public’s attention 
President Bush’s efforts to seek funds to reward some of the coalition partners 
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who shared the burdens of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.50 Although the 
administration did not reveal which countries would be rewarded, except for 
Poland, media sources predict that Romania is a potential recipient, based on its 
contribution of approximately 700 troops in Iraq and 500 troops in Afghanistan. 
 Another initiative that seems profitable for the East Europeans is re-
deployment of the American military bases from Germany. It is a long process 
estimated to take ten years. This initiative aims to close American bases that 
were designed to answer a Cold War set of threats and redeploy them in areas 
that are closer to potential sources of conflict or that represent a strategic stop in 
troop routes. Actions taken by the United States as NATO’s patron are meant to 
credit the southern flank with much more importance, which explains U.S. 
interest in opening bases in Romania and Bulgaria.      
 This could be seen as a major incentive for the countries; it can also be 
read as an expansion of Romanian defense relationships with allies and the 
building of new partnerships. Again, it is a reciprocal beneficial situation; the 
Alliances’ forces will improve the flexibility to contend with the increasingly 
uncertain nature of emerging threats to global security, and the countries’ 
benefits are multilateral. 
 The U.S. military is about to secure agreements with Bulgaria and 
Romania that would enable troops to train at extensive bases, perhaps by the 
end of the year 2005. The United States was looking at up to five facilities in 
each country for use by Army, Air Force, and Navy/Marine units, according to 
Marine Gen. James L. Jones, commander of both the U.S. European Command 
and NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. “This is part and 
parcel of the transformation of our footprint in Europe, which has been in need of 
surgery for some time.”51 President Bush announced in 2004 his intention to 
 
50 “Bush seeks $400 million to reward Allies,” text available at: 
www.abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=486157, accessed on 11 February 2005. 
51 Remarks made by General James Jones after his visits in Romania (12-13 January 2005), 
Bulgaria, and Lithuania; breakfast meeting with reporters in Casteau, Belgium. General J. Jones 
is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander of the United States 
European Command (COMUSEUCOM). 
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move some of the troops from Germany and South Korea. Bush also said that 
new, smaller bases would be established in Eastern Europe and Africa. Instead 
of maintaining large heavily deployable ones, it would use smaller, more austere 
facilities where troops would rotate in for shorter deployments. The Bulgarian and 
Romanian sites “are purely military sites, without family, without infrastructure 
changes.” Over the past two years, U.S. military planners have said that a 
network of smaller bases spread around the world will provide more flexibility in 
dealing with terrorism, regional crises, and other emerging threats. Romania and 
Bulgaria are considered particularly well suited to host U.S. bases because of 
their proximity to volatile regions in the Balkans, Caucuses, and Middle East. 
“That has had a reassuring effect.”52
E. ROMANIA’S SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION TO TRANSATLANTIC 
RELATIONS 
“Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum”: “if you want peace, prepare 
for war,” is an old Latin saying that today is more accurate than ever.   
Romania’s geographic proximity to areas reigned over by the gods of war 
taught us to praise peace and security more than other countries. And since it 
chooses to adhere to NATO principles, it is Romania’s responsibility and duty to 
make a fair contribution to the Alliance in any possible way. This contribution may 
take different forms (political, military) or may address different levels (regional or 
international).  
The political pledge to continue promoting the values Romania shares and 
respects is the engine that will support further endeavors. This must be the first 
sustainable pillar of Euro-Atlantic mutual assurance in countering outside 
pressures. The fear of being vulnerable in the face of threats, without the help of 
a friend, drove most Europeans and Americans to credit the security community 
with more than empty words. Just as President Kennedy felt more than forty 
 
52 Remarks made by General James Jones after his visits in Romania (12-13 January 2005), 
Bulgaria, and Lithuania; breakfast meeting with reporters in Casteau, Belgium. General J. Jones 
is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander of the United States 
European Command (COMUSEUCOM). 51. 
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years ago like “ein Berliner” (1963), showing American support for the West 
Germans, European leaders felt like New Yorkers in 2001, showing their 
unconditional support. The divide over Iraq or other issues that may appear on 
NATO’s horizons, must not and cannot erase or dilute the closeness of 
transatlantic relations.   
Militarily, the Romanian contribution is very evident. Romanian troops are 
part of operations conducted in remote areas as well as in its relative vicinity, 
demonstrating Romania’s willingness and reliability. This is the best way to 
protect Romanian interests and to bear some of the Alliance’s burdens. NATO 
operations may benefit and become more effective from Romania’s extensive 
knowledge and understanding of the region, as happened in the Balkans. 
Another specific contribution lies in providing support in military fields less 
covered by the rest of the allies. The concept of niche capabilities was launched 
at the Prague summit in 2002 to reduce the gaps and to augment the operational 
efficiency that goes hand-in-hand with the much desired interoperability. These 
provided the motivation for Romania to reform its military forces toward 
professionalization and to develop specific capabilities in which NATO is running 
a deficit. 
The difficulties presented by the current environment require a high level 
of coordination between the armed forces and the post-conflict teams. That 
prompted Romania to prepare in fields such as military police, light infantry, 
engineering units, and civil and military cooperation (CIMIC). 
In the context of the Iraq war, U.S. military strategists realized that 
Romania and its neighbor, Bulgaria, present a definite strategic relevance. 
Romania’s infrastructure is valuable for the rapidity of the troops flux to and from 
Iraq, especially when the Turkish Parliament did not permit entry of the U.S. 
troops into its territory. Therefore, one of the alternative routes chosen was 
Romania, which has the necessary infrastructure. Moreover, the success in using 
the Romanian infrastructure led to the idea of setting American military bases on 
Romanian territory. Consequently, Romania changed its attribute from being a 
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buffer zone to being a gate to and from Europe, whose enforcement serves 
national interests and allies’ interests as well. 
F. THE IMPLICATIONS OF EVENTS IN 2005  
Romania is in the process of redefining one of its most important 
documents: the National Security Strategy. At the beginning of March 2005 the 
Supreme Council of National Defense was drafting a new Security Strategy. After 
NATO membership, Romanian strategic objectives have changed. From a static 
and reactive strategy aiming to counteract any threats, the Council53 seriously 
considered a bold and dynamic approach. Then newly elected Romanian 
president, Traian Basescu, shared this information with the press when he 
emphasized the preemptive character that the new strategy might have in light of 
the threats our country identified.  
 President’s Basescu’s vivacity might have something to do with the more 
vibrant and courageous actions recently taken by Romania in foreign relations. 
On March 9, 2005, President Basescu visited Washington at the official invitation 
of President Bush. In a press conference following the meeting, President Bush 
took the opportunity to call Romania a “strong NATO partner”54 and recognized 
the efforts it made in Afghanistan and Iraq along with other coalition forces. 
President Bush also appreciated President Basescu’s valuable advice on 
Moldova, which is Romania’s eastern neighbor, whose leadership is affiliated 
with Moscow ideals and values. The atmosphere of the press conference 
illustrated an evolution; the familiarity of the gestures during the press conference 
went beyond the protocol and gave the impression of a meeting between two old 
friends, indicators of the quality of current U.S.-Romania relations and their 
reciprocal perceptions.  
One day prior to the Presidents’ meeting, on March 8, the Committee for 
Foreign Relation of the U.S. Senate held a hearing on the importance of the 
Black Sea to U.S. interests. Bruce Jackson, president of the Transitional 
 
53 National Defense Council  
54 “Bush praises Romania as strong NATO partner,” Wall Street Journal, March 9 2005. 
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Democracies Project, presented to the committee members the arguments that 
supported the strategic importance of Black Sea.55 He emphasized the 
importance of the Black Sea as the gate to and from the Middle East and Central 
Asia. “Today, the member states of the European Union import approximately 
50% of their energy needs; by 2020 imports will rise to 70% of consumption. This 
increase will be delivered to Europe across and around the Black Sea region, on 
routes such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. These facts so impressed the 
heads of state of member states of NATO that at the Istanbul Summit in July 
2004 the NATO Joint Communiqué recognized that the Black Sea region was an 
essential part of Euro-Atlantic security.”56
 This testimony is in agreement with President Basescu’s new foreign 
policy, which aims to boost the role of the Black Sea in conjunction with fortifying 
bilateral relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. His dedicated 
efforts and the political commitment associated with the development of these 
regional cooperation instruments confer a greater credibility on the common 
approaches and consolidate the common confidence. 
 
 
55 Text available at: http//:foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2005/hrg050308p.html, accessed on 
March 10, 2005. 
56 “The future of Democracy on the Black Sea region,” testimony given by Bruce Jackson 
before the Committee of Foreign Relations, subcommittee of European Affairs. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
“It is our noble mission to do so.”57
After the last fifteen years, the world is nothing like it used to be and it 
seems to get smaller and less predictable. The international order has changed 
radically. In this context, state responses to a new and violent set of threats had 
to speed up. The international environment became the arena for a new world 
system, based on more intricate relations. The only balance that states want to 
achieve in the current situation is between institutional and unilateral approaches, 
which, ultimately, seem to be the prerogative of the powerful states.  
From the institutional perspective, some of the organizations managed to 
survive the time, some did not. I believe that the organizations that did not 
survive lacked a rational foundation and, therefore, their collapse was imminent. 
One of the survivors, NATO, seems to be a perfect example of a success story in 
diplomacy.  
More than fifty years have passed since NATO was established and it is 
still relevant to its members, as well as to the international arena as a whole. 
Countries are still knocking at its door to enter (aspirant countries) and other 
international organizations ask it to enforce peace settlements (the UN invited 
NATO in Bosnia I Herzegovina and Kosovo). Besides these efforts NATO is also 
committed to the war against terrorism (Afghanistan). 
One of the keys to NATO’s success is its political and operational 
transformation. Its successive enlargements had a positive impact on both the 
target countries and on the Alliance. They also had an impact at the symbolic 
level, removing the artificial line that divided West from East Europe for more 
than fifty years. Not only did it close the distance between the two, it was also 
mutually beneficial in finding better ways to cope with the new threats and 
adversities that lie ahead.    
 
57“The role of new NATO allies and the future of the transatlantic security cooperation,” 
speech delivered by the former Romanian Secretary of Defense, George Cristian Maior, at 
National Defense University on 10 March 2004. 
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Consequently, NATO prepared itself for the enlargement process. It was 
the most important process not only because of its symbolic charge, but also 
because of its inner consequences and its radical transformation. It was the 
mechanism that guaranteed NATO’s survival, and relevance and its adaptation to 
a new globalized security environment.  
The multiple changes that Europe experienced in the early 1990s changed 
Europe’s landscape. On the other side of the Atlantic, the 9/11 attacks changed 
U.S. foreign policy entirely. Subsequently, the U.S. perception of Europe and the 
European attitude towards the United States changed, too. They, however, did 
not change the fundamentals and goals of their relations, but the methods and 
modalities used to achieve them. 
In this paradigm, there are multiple roles that the newest NATO members 
can play inside the organization. They can share their experiences; they can 
actively participate in operations, doing their duty as defenders of peace and 
democracy; and they can dissipate tensions by maintaining equilibrium in their 
policies with the parties involved. Their political pledges are fully demonstrated 
through their support and participation in military operations. Most of the new 
entries are participating in missions led by different entities.  
For example, Romania is participating with troops in NATO-led operations 
(ISAF, Afghanistan), US-led operations (Iraq, Afghanistan), and EU-led 
operations (ALTHEA58) demonstrating willingness and balanced attitudes in 
regard to its partners. Another reason for participating in these operations is to 
prove that one organization/coalition/state does not exclude others; on the 
contrary, they reinforce one another, following complementarity principles.  
Maintaining peace and security in their neighborhood is another way to 
fulfilling the responsibilities that come with member status. A regional vocation for 
most of the small and medium countries is encouraged by NATO and is 
reassuring for members. It is also a way of burden mitigation. In fact, the 
 
58 ALTHEA is an EU-led operation, which is the continuance of the NATO-led SFOR in 
Bosnia i Herzegovina beginning in December 2004.  
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enlargement process is more than just accepting countries; it is an enhancement 
of the security area covered by the Alliance. In this regard, the outposts of this 
area have an important role in protecting the boundaries. They also have a role 
in sharing experiences with their neighbors, with the intent of defusing any 
potential tensions. This is actually the role that Romania has played in the region, 
even before it was invited to join the Alliance. The Balkans and the Caucasus are 
regions with a high potential for instability (the so-called frozen conflicts); 
therefore, it is in the interest of both NATO and Romania to solve the problems 
by any means possible, before they erupt into conflicts. 
Cohesion among members was put to the test in a real-life situation. If 
after the 9/11 attacks the relation reached the highest degree of their unity, the 
Iraq war represented the lowest degree of their disagreements. In this equation 
of delicate balance, I can say that the new members played a sensible role in 
alleviating the differences through various methods. This reasoning further 
applies to the new allies, whose reliability and allegiance were put to the test both 
prior and during the Iraq 2003 war. 
The two platoon leaders, Poland and Romania, demonstrated their 
dedication to NATO’s values and principles. They made the biggest contribution 
to the war-fighting effort, even while in the process of a military transformation 
toward more flexible and versatile forces. This is the way they contribute to 
maintaining and developing transatlantic relations.   
The further specific role that Romania will play in the region or in NATO as 
a whole is in the process of being defined. The latest events corroborated with its 
geo-strategic location prompt me to the conclusion that its specific contribution is 
even more important that Romanians thought it would be. The latest declarations 
made by Ron Asmus, Chief Executive of the George Marshall Fund, support this 
conclusion. 
In an exclusive interview granted to a Romanian newspaper (14 March 
2005), Asmus infers that Romania may play the role of leader in Black Sea 
security. The Black Sea region is the route of the so-called “asymmetric risks” 
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and ”frozen conflicts.” The way Romania decided to promote NATO values is to 
be actively involved in the region. In his interview, Ron Asmus acknowledged 
Romania’s potential since it became part of the Alliance, and he encouraged 
member countries to see the Black Sea as an opportunity, not as a problem, and 
as a long term investment, not an expense.  
The importance of the Black Sea has increased since the Iraq war when it 
proved useful. Hence the importance of having a route clear of threats and 
secure for future purposes. 
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